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REGULATING PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF TRULY
NEW SECURITIES: FIRST PRINCIPLES
MERRITT B. FOX†
ABSTRACT
The public offering of truly new securities involves purchases by
investors in sufficient number and in small enough blocks that each
purchaser’s shares can reasonably be expected to be freely tradable in
a secondary market that did not exist before the offering. Increasing the
ability of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to make such
offerings has been the subject of much recent discussion.
At the time that a firm initially contemplates such an offering,
unusually large information asymmetries exist between its insiders and
potential investors. These can lead to severe adverse-selection problems
that prevent a substantial portion of worthy offerings from being
successfully marketed. A regime relying solely on market-based
antidotes to this problem—signaling, underwriter reputation, and
accountant certification—and backed only by liability for intentional
affirmative misrepresentation will fall well short of being a solution.
This shortfall suggests a role for regulation.
This Article goes back to first principles to determine the proper
content of such regulation. The relevant questions include: What
should issuers be required to disclose at the time of the offering and
thereafter? Under what circumstances should various offering
participants be liable for damages if, at the time of the offering, there
were misstatements or omissions? And should this regime be
mandatory or optional? The answers are then used to critically evaluate
a number of recent U.S. reforms aimed at increasing SME offerings by
lessening regulatory burdens. These include Securities Act Rule 506(c),
Regulation A+, and the new crowdfunding rules.
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INTRODUCTION
The world of public securities offerings can be divided sharply into
two archetypical categories. One relates to offerings by established
issuers of securities that are identical to securities already trading in
liquid, efficient secondary markets. The other relates to public
offerings by issuers new to the market whose securities are not already
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trading in some kind of secondary market. This Article lays out some
first principles with regard to this second kind of public offering.1 As
the term is used here, an offering is “public” if a large enough group of
portfolio investors each purchases a small enough block of securities
that the amount purchased can be reasonably expected to be freely
tradable subsequently in some kind of a secondary market.2 Thus, for
example, under U.S. law, an offering involving a general solicitation
made pursuant to the provisions of Rule 506(c)3 could be a public
offering, even though it does not require registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act).4 The same can be said of an
offering made under Regulation A+.5
The first category—offerings of securities of a type already trading
in a liquid, efficient market—was the focus of much regulatory concern
and reform in the three preceding decades, starting with the integrated
disclosure and short-form registration reforms in the 1980s and
culminating with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC)
2005 Offering Reforms,6 which included automatic shelf registration
for offerings of well-known seasoned issuers. The current decade has
seen a shift in the focus of regulatory reform to the second
category—offerings of truly new securities. A number of factors have
been driving this change in focus. One relates to an increased concern
with promoting innovation to stimulate the rate of economic growth.
This concern is combined with the belief that potential early investors
1. For a parallel effort with respect to the first category of transactions, see generally
Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2009)
[hereinafter Fox, Civil Liability] (discussing disclosure obligations of established issuers and the
structure of liabilities for their breach).
2. There are, of course, many offerings that may be in need of regulation but that do not
fall neatly into one of these two categories. One example would be an offering where there is
secondary trading already in identical securities, but the secondary market cannot be properly
described as liquid and efficient. Another example would be an offering where there is no
secondary trading prior to the offering and one cannot reasonably expect such trading to develop
after the offering, given the limited number of purchasers purchasing relatively small blocks. Such
situations have been subject to cogent analysis elsewhere by Professors Donald Langevoort and
Robert Thompson. See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 372 (2013). Still, a
significant portion of all new issues of securities does fall into one of the two archetypical
categories set out here.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
4. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(b) (2012).
5. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260 (2015).
6. See generally Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange
Act Release No. 52,026, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug.
3, 2005).
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in innovative new companies will be more willing to commit funds if
they anticipate that a public-offering exit for their investments will be
available in the future if the firm succeeds.7 Another relates to worries,
arising since the 2008–2009 financial crisis, that small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) have been having greater difficulty obtaining
bank financing because banks are cutting back on lending to repair
their balance sheets and meet new capital requirements.8 In the wake
of the crisis, there is also interest in restoring, on a sounder basis than
before, residential mortgage securitizations, another type of truly new
securities offering.
In response, there have been a variety of reforms, some already
implemented and others just recently proposed, aimed at promoting
public offerings of truly new securities. Many of these actual or
proposed reforms grow out of provisions of the JOBS Act9 and the
FAST Act10 and the SEC’s efforts at their implementation. These
reforms, in one way or another, ease or entirely eliminate the burdens
that the Securities Act registration process imposes on the various
participants in the offering at the time that it occurs and that the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s (Exchange Act) continuingdisclosure requirements impose on the issuer thereafter.11 This easing
can take the form of reducing or eliminating what is required to be
disclosed. It can involve reducing or eliminating previously imposed
restrictions on communications or on the timing of the transaction. It
can also take the form of reducing the likelihood of litigation by
altering the standard of liability applicable to participants in the
offering if sued by purchasers claiming to have been damaged by a
material misstatement or omission during the offering process. The
effort across the Atlantic to create a new European capital market

7. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 266 (1999).
8. See Gert Wehinger, Bank Deleveraging, the Move from Bank to Market-Based Financing,
and SME Financing, OECD J., Jan. 2012, at 65, 68–70.
9. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-06, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 306,
315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012)).
10. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §§ 71001–
71003, 129 Stat. 1312, 1784 (2015) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77f (Supp. III 2015)).
11. See generally Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the PublicPrivate Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013)
(discussing the impact of loosening regulations from the JOBS Act and other reforms on earlystage capital raising).
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reflects similar concerns,12 as do efforts in emerging economies such as
Brazil to connect SMEs with the capital markets.13
Much of the discussion of these reforms has taken place without a
frame of reference. Reform proponents have tended to tell an overly
simple story. In the U.S. discussion, for example, the starting point is
the clearly correct proposition that the burdens imposed by the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, because of their fixed-costs
aspects, fall particularly heavily on smaller firms. The proponents then
go on to argue that more offerings by such firms are a good thing and
thus these burdens should be lightened for them. Reform opponents
have a simple story as well. They simply fear that reducing the burdens
will result in more investors putting up good money and later, unfairly,
having nothing to show for it.
This Article seeks to add rigor to the debate. Absent regulation,
the determination of which public offerings go forward and succeed at
raising funds, and which do not, is determined by tort law and the
market-determined terms of contracts into which offering participants
enter. The issue is whether, and, if so, under what circumstances,
government regulation should be added to the mix. Such regulation can
help determine what should be disclosed both at the time of the
offering and thereafter. It can also determine the circumstances under
which various offering participants should be held liable for damages
if, at the time of the offering, there were misstatements or omissions of
required disclosures. This Article goes back to first principles as a guide
to answering these questions from the points of view of promoting
efficiency and fairness.
Any time an issuer first contemplates a public offering of truly new
securities, the information asymmetries between persons associated
with the issuer and potential investors are particularly large because,
unlike an established issuer whose securities are trading in an efficient
market, much less is typically known about the issuer and the persons
associated with it. Also, there is no price in the secondary trading
market to serve as some kind of valuation of the securities being
offered. These two observations are relatively self-evident, but they

12. See generally Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, COM (2015) 468 final
(Sept. 30, 2015) (discussing reforms to increase financing for European SMEs).
13. INT’L GROWTH & EMERGING MKTS. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’RS, SME FINANCING THROUGH CAPITAL MARKETS 62 (2015), https://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD493.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL88-SZBK].
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have several less obvious implications that are important to answering
the basic questions posed here.
First, the presence of these information asymmetries can lead to a
severe adverse-selection problem.14 This problem will prevent a
substantial portion of worthy offerings from being successfully
marketed unless, as an antidote, investors are made confident that
issuers are providing a certain level of credible disclosure at the time
of the offering. A regime relying solely on market-based antidotes to
these problems—signaling, underwriter reputation, and accountant or
credit-rating certification—and backed only by liability for intentional
affirmative misrepresentation is, in many circumstances, not a
sufficient solution. More specifically, the larger the number of offerees,
the lesser their financial sophistication, and the smaller the absolute
number of dollars each is likely to invest, the less likely it is that such a
regime will be an adequate solution. One option is for the government
or a respected private entity to offer to issuers a regime that requires
them to make certain disclosures but to make its adoption optional so
that similarly situated issuers not adopting the regime would still be
allowed to make offerings. For a variety of reasons, however, this is
unlikely to be a complete solution to the problem.
Second, the adverse-selection problem will not be solved by
disclosure rules alone. There must be appropriately negative
consequences for untruthful or incomplete answers. As the
consequences become more severe, however, not only are more
unworthy offerings blocked, fewer worthy offerings go ahead as well.
Getting the balance right requires a focus on what kind of liability—
strict, strict with a due-diligence defense, or negligence—should be
imposed on issuers, on underwriters and others in the distribution
process, and on accountants and other certifiers to deter dishonesty
and to assure the optimal level of care by each.
Third, the severity of the adverse-selection problem at the time of
a public offering of truly new securities can also be ameliorated by the
prospect of a certain level of ongoing periodic disclosure thereafter.
This is because the ongoing-disclosure regime, through a variety of
mechanisms, improves an issuer’s corporate governance discipline.
This in turn renders less important the fact that, at time of the offering,

14. Adverse selection occurs when a potential market participant with a high-quality offering
decides not to enter the market because persons on the other side of the market cannot distinguish
it from participants with lower-quality offerings. For a more detailed discussion of this concept,
see infra Part I.
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investors typically know relatively less about the intentions and
abilities of the managers of issuers of truly new securities compared to
what they know with respect to established issuers trading in efficient
liquid markets.
Finally, a public offering of truly new securities is not a silver bullet
for the capital-raising problems of all firms that, up until this point,
have been privately held. A public offering can benefit society by
providing an issuer with a promising investment project not just
funding but a critical gateway to getting its securities publicly traded.
Publicly traded securities are more valuable because they are more
liquid. A public offering can also do harm, however, by providing an
issuer seeking to implement an unpromising investment project with a
route by which to fund it, thereby squandering society’s scarce savings
that could otherwise go to a more worthwhile project. Appropriate
attention to the first principles discussed here can help design a
regulatory system that can improve the terms of the tradeoff between
these potential benefits and harms. The hard reality, though, is that
there are considerable economies of scale involved in complying with
such a regime. This means that there will be a size of issuer and a size
of offering below which such offerings become too expensive to be
worthwhile even if the regime is at the optimal point on the frontier of
this tradeoff. Not every company with a worthy new real investment
project is a good candidate for a public offering.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I considers the especially
severe information-asymmetry problem that plagues primary offerings
of truly new securities. As a result, the market for such securities can
partially or totally unravel. Part II considers market-based solutions for
these problems—signaling, investment bank intermediation, expert
certification, and buyer search—as well as the shortcomings of
exclusive reliance on such solutions. Part III considers the rationale for
having, as a further antidote to the adverse-selection problem, a
government-designed affirmative-disclosure regime, whereby an issuer
making an offering is required to answer certain questions. It addresses
as well the question of whether this regime should be imposed on all
issuers making such offerings or only those that volunteer to be
subjected to it. Part IV considers the rationale, under either such
regime, for mandating the imposition of liability on issuers, issuer
directors and officers, underwriters, dealers, and experts such as
accountants or rating agencies when there have been material
misstatements or material omissions of what was required to be
disclosed. It considers as well, for each of these potential defendants,
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the appropriate standards for imposing such liability with regard to
questions of fault and due diligence and to burdens of evidentiary
persuasion. Part V applies the preceding discussion to reforms
intended to ease the burdens associated with offerings by smaller, new
corporate issuers and considers as a general matter the role that the
size of the issuer and the offering should play in the strictness of
offering regulation.
I. THE INFORMATION-ASYMMETRY PROBLEM
When an issuer first contemplates making a public offering of truly
new securities, there exist particularly large information asymmetries.
This is a very different situation from a public offering by an
established issuer that trades in a liquid, efficient market and has a
publicly known track record over a period of time. Potential investors
in an offering by an issuer of truly new securities are likely to have little
knowledge of the issuer’s past performance, if indeed it has one, and of
the capabilities of the issuer’s managers. Potential investors are also
unlikely to have much knowledge of the inclination, if any, of the
issuer’s managers, or of any remaining control shareholders, to divert
issuer cash flows to themselves after the offering. There is also no price
in the secondary trading market, which, for an established issuer, is,
according to the efficient-market hypothesis, an unbiased evaluation of
the offered securities based on all publicly available information. The
existence of this severe information asymmetry can lead to adverseselection problems that, absent an antidote, will lead to many worthy
offerings being saleable only at prices so low that making the offering
will not be worthwhile to the issuer and its control shareholders.
A. Adverse Selection in Markets Generally
Before considering information-asymmetry models specifically
focused on markets for securities, it is helpful to review briefly some
more general models that relate to all markets. To understand the basic
problem posed by asymmetric information, consider a competitive
market where some potential sellers are prepared to sell what they
know to be a high-quality version of a product and others are prepared
to sell what they know to be a low-quality version. The product’s
quality is not observable to potential buyers and none of the buyers
know which sellers are high quality and which are low quality. As
Professor George Akerlof showed in his classic 1970 article concerning
adverse selection (or the “lemons problem”), if nothing alters this

FOX IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

TRULY NEW SECURITIES

11/28/2016 3:27 PM

681

asymmetric-information situation, the low-quality version of the
product can drive the high-quality version out of the market.15
To illustrate, assume, for example, that the buyers know that 50
percent of the sellers are offering the high-quality version and 50
percent the low-quality version. Assume that if both kinds of sellers
were offering the product in the market and, contrary to the facts as I
am setting them out, the buyers knew the quality of what they were
buying, the market-clearing price would be one hundred dollars for the
high-quality version and eighty dollars for the low-quality version.
Assume also that the market is competitive: the quantity sold by any
given seller or purchased by any given buyer will not affect price. Given
that buyers in fact do not know the quality of the product being offered
by any of the sellers, rational buyers would pay all sellers ninety dollars
per item. This would be the expected value of a purchase because there
would be a 50 percent chance it was from a high-quality seller and a 50
percent chance that it was from a low-quality seller. This result would
not be an equilibrium solution, however. Suppose, for example, that
the high-quality sellers’ reservation price—the cost to them of parting
with their goods—is anything greater than ninety dollars. Under these
circumstances, the potential high-quality sellers would not enter the
market in the first place. The buyers would then know that only the
low-quality version would be available and the product would be
priced accordingly. This information asymmetry would cause a loss in
economic welfare. If everyone were fully informed, there would have
been transactions in the high-quality version of the good between
willing buyers and sellers. Their mutual willingness to enter into the
transactions would have shown that they each expected to gain from
doing so. The absence of their opportunities to do so means the loss of
these expected gains.
B. Application in Securities Markets
In the seminal adverse-selection model with respect to securities,
Professors Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf demonstrate that a firm
with what its insiders know is a profitable, positive net present value
(NPV) real investment project16 proposal may pass up implementing

15. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 491–93 (1970).
16. An investment project’s NPV equals its expected future net revenues discounted to
present value less the project’s cost. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS &
FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 85–89 (8th ed. 2006).
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the project if new securities must be issued to finance it.17 The securities
of such a firm are the high-quality version of the product discussed
above. The market cannot distinguish them from the securities of firms
with less promising projects. The market thus prices the securities of
all the firms in the pool at a lower price reflecting the average expected
return for the total pool. This lower pooling-equilibrium price per
security would require the firm with the positive NPV project, in order
to raise enough cash to finance its implementation, to issue more
securities than if they could be sold at a higher price. Issuing more
securities obliges the firm to pay more in expected future dividends or
interest. The project, despite being more promising than most, may still
not generate sufficient expected cash flow to justify these greater
expected obligations, in which case the issuer will not make the
offering. Unless another form of financing can be found, society will
lose because scarce savings will go instead to a less promising project.
Now imagine a range of potential issuers in terms of their share
qualities, with the worst having shares that would be worth nothing to
anyone purchasing them because of some mix of poor expected
underlying cash flow and diversions by control shareholders. The
highest-quality issuers, as described just above, would not enter the
market in the first place. But now the next-highest-quality issuers
would be in the same position as the highest-quality issuers would have
been if they had stayed in the market. This is because the price offered
to these next-highest-quality issuers would be an average of the
expected value of their shares and the values of the shares of all the
lower-quality issuers. So now these next-highest-quality issuers would
not enter the market. Moving down the list in terms of the quality of
an issuer’s shares, this story can be repeated again and again. In the
end, in the absence of any antidotes to this adverse-selection problem,
the market unravels completely, just like the high-quality product in
the example in the initial discussion of adverse selection,18 and there
are no share offerings to portfolio investors.

17. Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187 (1984). A
positive NPV project is one where the project’s cost is less than the expected future net revenues
from the project discounted to present value at a rate of market return for cash flows with
comparable risk. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 16, at 17. Because this market rate of
return represents the opportunity cost of implementing the project, implementing the project
enhances economic welfare in society.
18. See supra Part I.A.
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In the real world, when a market for offerings by a given type of
issuer just opens, there may be an initial burst of irrational exuberance
such that the full impact of adverse selection may not be felt
immediately. As a result, a number of unworthy, as well as worthy,
offerings will succeed in being marketed.19 Over time, though, many of
the issuers of the unworthy offerings will not perform well for reasons
that were known at the time of the offering but not disclosed. Thus,
even if the rational-actor assumption in the adverse-selection model
described above is not fully correct, without some kind of antidote to
the information asymmetries, the unraveling of the market that it
predicts will happen eventually.20
C. The Additional Problem of No Guidance from Secondary-Market
Prices
It is important to see that this adverse-selection problem is much
more severe in the case of a possible offering of truly new securities
compared to an offering by an established issuer whose identical
securities are already trading in an efficient secondary market. The
potential investor in an offering by an established issuer of this type has
the guidance of the price in the secondary market, which, because the
market is efficient, is as good an estimate as can be obtained of the
security’s value based on publicly available information.21 Thus she can
be confident that the price she pays in the offering, if it is close to the
secondary-market price, is, in terms of what is publicly known, fair and
unbiased even if she personally obtains none of this information. In
contrast, there is no price to provide such guidance in the case of the
offering by the issuer of the truly new security. Thus the rational
investor, before contemplating a purchase in a public offering of truly
19. See Robert Forsythe, Russell Lundholm & Thomas Rietz, Cheap Talk, Fraud, and
Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 481,
482–85 (1999) (discussing experimental evidence that investors will credit false claims not policed
by tough sanctions so that the signaling model will fail).
20. The German effort to facilitate public offerings by SMEs by setting up a new market with
less stringent requirements for initial public offerings (IPOs) is an illustration of the problem. It
had initial success followed by collapse. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana
Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the
United States, and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 502–07 (2011); Hans-Peter Burghof
& Adrian Hunger, Access to Stock Markets for Small and Medium Sized Growth Firms: The
Temporary Success and Ultimate Failure of Germany’s Neuer Markt 4 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=497404 [https://perma.cc/G3WM-3DNL].
21. The efficient-market hypothesis from financial economics holds that the prices of
securities of large, established issuers trading in liquid markets fully reflect all publicly available
information. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 16, at 337–41.
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new securities, must either acquire and analyze this information herself
or rely on an advisor who does this for her. And if this information is
not conveniently available to her or her advisor in a credible and easily
usable fashion, the market for such an offering is even further
handicapped relative to the market for an offering by an established
issuer.22
D. The Social-Welfare Challenge Posed by Information Asymmetries
To understand the economic-welfare implications of the
information asymmetries discussed above, engage in a brief thought
experiment that contrasts two hypothetical worlds. They share in
common that public offerings of truly new securities are the only way
of funding proposed new real investment projects, but they differ
sharply as to who knows what.
The first is a nirvana world with no information asymmetries. In
such a world, everyone’s expectations concerning a possible new
offering would be based on the aggregation of all bits of information
that initially are known by anyone in the world. Funds would find their
way from investors to real investment projects in every instance where
it was mutually advantageous for this to happen. Every offering would,
based on all known information, be priced properly. In the process, the
economy’s most promising proposed real investment projects would be
implemented going down the list in rank order to the point where
society’s scarce savings were exhausted.
The second is a world with the large information asymmetries that
exist in the real world when an issuer first contemplates making a
public offering of truly new securities. Unlike the real world, however,
these asymmetries are not ameliorated by any market-based antidotes
or regulatory interventions, nor are there alternative mechanisms for
allocating scarce savings to proposed real investment projects. As
described above, the market for offerings of truly new securities would
unravel completely.23 There would be no real investment because there
would be no way for savers and proponents of new real investment

22. In contrast, for registered public offerings of large, established issuers in the United
States, the issuer need make available to prospective investors only a brief prospectus, under the
theory that the efficient-market hypothesis assures that all publicly available information is
reflected in the securities’ secondary-market trading price. See Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1,
at 243–45, 243 n.10.
23. See supra Part I.B.
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projects to connect. As a result, there would be a huge shortfall in
economic welfare in comparison to the first world.
The task then is to design a financial system that minimizes this
economic-welfare shortfall. We need to move as far as possible from
the second world toward a system that allocates society’s scarce savings
among all the proposed real investment projects in the economy in the
way it would be allocated in the first world. To do so in a cost-effective
way, however, we need to take account of the fact that all mechanisms
of allocating savings to fund real investment projects consume real
resources as they deal with the problems posed by the initial
information asymmetries.
In thinking about such a system, the first thing to note is that public
offerings of truly new securities are not in fact the only mechanism by
which scarce savings are allocated to proposed real investment
projects. There are a variety of institutions, ranging from commercial
banks, insurance companies, and investment banks to investment funds
including venture capital, that provide debt and equity financing
privately. Existing issuers can also finance projects from their internal
cash flows. Existing publicly traded issuers can make public offerings
of securities identical to what is already trading in the market. Given
that there is a tradeoff between the costs of dealing with initial
information-asymmetry problems and the capacity of a financial
channel to find the most promising real investment opportunities, for
many proposed projects, one or more of these other mechanisms for
deciding funding is superior to a public offering of truly new securities.
Nevertheless, there are promising proposed projects for which
such an offering is the best funding vehicle and that will not be funded
if this vehicle is not available. There are multiple reasons for this. A
claim on a dollar of future expected cash flow is more valuable if it is
publicly traded than if it is not because it is more liquid and can easily
be included in a risk-reducing diversified portfolio.24 Moreover, the
public market for new issues of securities seems more sensitive to the
potentialities of innovative proposed investment projects than internal
funding by existing, established publicly traded firms.25
24. See, e.g., William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on
Stock Prices, 47 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 60, 60, 62 (1991) (“Companies issuing restricted stock alongside
registered securities trading in the open market usually offer a price discount on the restricted
securities to compensate for their relative illiquidity.”).
25. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Promoting Innovation: The Law of Publicly Traded
Corporations, 5 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y 1 (2010) (arguing that the diversity of potential providers
of funds in an IPO and of the information channels by which they become informed makes this
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Thus, there will be a significant loss in economic welfare to the
extent that adverse selection prevents the market for public offerings
of truly new securities from functioning. Minimizing this loss is what
prompts the discussion that follows.
II. MARKET-BASED SOLUTIONS TO ADVERSE-SELECTION
PROBLEMS
This Part considers the extent to which market-based antidotes to
the adverse-selection problem would, by themselves, allow a market
for truly new securities to function. The only parts of the legal system
on which these antidotes rely are contract and tort law. There are a
number of such antidotes: signaling, investment bank intermediation,
expert certification, and reliance on the search by other buyers. In the
discussion that follows, it is useful, before considering models
specifically focused on markets for securities, to return to the example
of the high- and low-quality products used above to explain adverse
selection.
A. Signaling
One market-based antidote to adverse selection—captured by
signaling models in information economics26—starts with the
assumption that the potential sellers of the high-quality version of a
product can credibly and economically communicate the quality of
what they are selling to the market. The sellers of the low-quality
version might stay silent. But, because it would be disadvantageous for
any seller of the high-quality version not to affirmatively communicate
the quality of what it is selling, buyers would infer that any seller that
remains silent is selling the low-quality version. The credibility of a
seller’s claim of high quality depends on the negative consequences
that it would suffer should its claim prove to be untrue. These negative
consequences could be in the form of legal liability or a loss in
reputation.
Modifying our earlier example involving the high-quality and lowquality versions of a product, all the sellers of the high-quality product
assert that their product is high quality and none of the sellers of the
low-quality product do. Buyers can tell which is which and will be

form of external finance more receptive to innovative investment proposals than is the case with
internal finance).
26. The seminal article is Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
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willing to pay one hundred dollars for the high-quality product, thus
assuring that it will be available in the market.
Signaling will fail to eliminate the information-asymmetry
problem, however, if a seller’s claim of high quality is not completely
credible. This will happen if buyers believe that a low-quality seller’s
expected gain from falsely claiming to be high quality can in some
circumstances exceed its expected cost. Signaling will also partially or
totally fail if buyers believe that a high-quality seller might sometimes
stay silent because there may be a cost to the seller of some other kind
in making the truthful claim of high quality. This cost might be greater
than the gain in terms of avoiding an adverse-selection discount.
The concept that signaling can be an antidote for adverse selection
in securities markets was first worked out in a model by Professor
Stephen Ross.27 Ross considers the situation where there is a hierarchy
of issuers with respect to a particular factor that could affect each of
their respective future cash flows. The issuer with the most favorable
situation with regard to this factor discloses this fact. In doing so, it
distinguishes itself from all the others, none of which can truthfully
claim that its situation is that favorable. The issuer with the next most
favorable situation discloses this fact so that market knows that,
although its situation is not as favorable as the first firm, it is more
favorable than all the remaining firms. This scenario repeats itself all
the way down the ladder. The issuer with the least favorable situation
may stay silent, but the market will infer from its silence that it is at the
bottom of the hierarchy.
For a number of reasons, however, this sort of signaling is not
likely to be a complete cure for information asymmetries in securities
markets. To start, silence is not a complete substitute for affirmatively
disclosing a lack of good news, because the market knows that there
are reasons other than a lack of good news why an issuer would choose
to remain silent. For example, a corporate issuer may choose not to
disclose certain information, even if favorable, because revealing it to
the market makes it available to competitors, major suppliers, and
major customers in ways that would be damaging to the profitability of
the issuer’s business.28 Also, the silence of an issuer concerning a
27. See generally Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications
of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177
(Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (synthesizing various disclosure issues and formulating an
economic framework within which disclosure issues can be examined).
28. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1984).
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certain factor at most only conveys that its situation is less favorable
than that of the issuers that do disclose something concerning the
matter. Silence does not convey how much less favorable. Thus,
disaster might be looming but the market is unaware.29
Signaling also only works if the buyers whose actions set the price
are attentive to the absence of disclosure on a topic and are
sophisticated in the inferences that they draw from this silence. This
may describe the situation in the case of a public offering by an
established issuer whose identical securities shares trade in a liquid,
efficient secondary market. In this situation, the secondary-market
price is determined by “smart money” traders, and the secondarymarket price, in turn, is the primary determinant of the price in the
issuer’s new public offering. It may also describe the situation in the
case of a private offering to a limited number of financially
sophisticated persons who are each making a substantial investment.30
It does not describe well a public offering of truly new securities.
B. Intermediation
A second way that the asymmetric-information problem may be
ameliorated is through the intermediation of a merchant that purchases
the items for resale, reliably identifies which items are high-quality
versions of the product and which are low-quality ones, and credibly
communicates the quality of what it resells to the buyers. The merchant
can profit from doing this by obtaining part or all of the gains from
trade from the sale of the high-quality version. In our ongoing product

29. Commentators have noted that, for this kind of reason, reality does not conform with
signaling theory’s prediction that voluntary disclosure will result in the market being fully
informed. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 745 (1984); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 5–7 n.24 (1983). Coffee points out that
the market was not able, from the silence of the issuers involved, even to begin to infer in advance
that New York City and the Washington Public Power System would each experience disastrous
defaults. Coffee, supra, at 745. These were the two largest defaults of publicly issued securities in
the history of the United States, but the issuers, as municipal entities, were exempt from the
mandatory-disclosure system under the federal securities laws. See Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory
Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 15, 18–19, 40–44 (1987).
30. Commentators have suggested that this concern explains the distinction that the
Securities Act and the SEC make between public offerings of securities, where registration
involving mandatory affirmative disclosure is required, and certain offerings that are limited to
more sophisticated investors that are exempted from such registration. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD,
ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 94, 96 (1994). As is
discussed more in Part IV, infra, although this rationale might explain some kind of limited
offering exemption from registration, it does not explain the breadth of the current exemption.
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example, these gains from trade would be the difference between the
high-quality sellers’ reservation price and the one hundred dollars that
the buyers would be willing to pay.31
The intermediating merchant’s claim of high quality could have
greater credibility than that of the seller because the merchant is better
capitalized and hence is more likely to be able to pay if it is sued for
making a false claim. The greater credibility could also be because the
intermediating merchant, as a more frequent player than the seller, has
developed a more substantial reputation for telling the truth than has
the seller, which in turn makes costlier the loss in reputation that would
result from falsely claiming that a product is high quality when it is not.
Underwriters perform this intermediating merchant function with
securities. Standard models of the role of underwriters of publicly
offered corporate equities and bonds suggest that they use their
reputation to certify that the offering price fairly reflects what is known
by the issuer’s insiders but not known, or at least not known for sure,
by the market.32 The asymmetry between the insiders and the market
may arise because potential investors are not sure that the issuer has
disclosed all relevant negative information possessed by insiders. It
may also arise because the insiders know positive information but do
not disclose it publicly out of concern that to do so would inform
competitors, suppliers, customers, or regulators in ways that would
harm the issuer. Or it may be that the insiders truthfully disclose
positive information but investors do not find their disclosure fully
credible because it might also be in the interests of these insiders to
make such a disclosure when it is not true.
In a firm-commitment underwriting, the underwriter engages in a
due-diligence investigation of the issuer. Then, as a frequent repeat
player whose credibility is developed over time, it “leases” its
reputation to the issuer by purchasing, and then reselling, the securities
on the basis of the issuer’s disclosures. These models suggest that an
underwriter engages in due diligence to the extent that, at the margin,
the cost of doing so equals the benefit to its reputation in terms of its
ongoing capacity to reduce the adverse-selection-induced discount
imposed by the market on the future offerings that it underwrites.33

31. See Akerlof, supra note 15, at 496.
32. See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the
Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 261–65 (1986); Ann E. Sherman, Underwriter
Certification and the Effect of Shelf Registration on Due Diligence, 28 FIN. MGMT. J. 5, 5–7 (1999).
33. Booth & Smith, supra note 32, at 267.
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The effectiveness of this mechanism in ameliorating information
asymmetry has its limits, however. An underwriter has difficulty
designing an optimal incentive scheme for its agents. On the one hand,
it wants its compensation arrangement to spur its agents to obtain feegenerating new underwritings. On the other hand, such a compensation
arrangement is likely to undermine the underwriter’s ability to
ameliorate information asymmetries because the arrangement will
tempt its agents to please the issuers that they solicit for underwritings
by forgoing a serious due-diligence investigation and by failing to insist
that the issuers’ disclosures be consistent with whatever negative
information is found by the investigation that they do conduct. In other
words, there is the risk that, in seeking underwritings, these agents will
free ride on the underwriter’s previously established reputational
capital. The underwriter’s credibility can, of course, also be enhanced
by a legal regime that, under specified circumstances, imposes liability
on it for misstatements.34
C. Third-Party Certification
A product certifier that reliably identifies which items are highquality versions of the item and credibly communicates what it has
discovered to the market performs a similar function to that of the
intermediating merchant. Relative to intermediation, this solution to
the adverse-selection problem has the advantage of not requiring that
the skills of quality assessment and those of merchandising be found in
the same entity. Moreover, compared to the intermediating merchant,
a certifier has the credibility advantage of not being able to make an
“end-game” profit by falsely claiming that the product it is selling is
high quality and receiving a high-quality product price. For securities,
the certifiers are auditors and, in the case of bonds and securitizations,
rating agencies. Reputational capital models similar to those

34. Judge Weinstein, in one of the early seminal cases concerning Securities Act Section 11’s
imposition on underwriters of strict liability subject to an affirmative due-diligence defense in
cases involving misstatements in registered offerings, justified requiring underwriters to “assume
an opposing posture with respect to management” by saying that the “average investor probably
assumes that some issuers will lie, but he probably has somewhat more confidence in the average
level of morality of an underwriter who has established a reputation for fair dealing.” Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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constructed for investment banks have been constructed as well with
respect to auditors35 and credit-rating agencies.36
Certifiers are sellers of information and as such face a problem not
faced by sellers of most products. Any one paying recipient can often
costlessly reproduce the certifier’s “product” and pass it on to others,
who then have no need to pay the certifier to get it. Thus, unlike most
other products, there are no additional sales to help compensate the
seller for the initial fixed costs of developing the product. Given that
providing reliable assessments is costly, these incentives problems
reduce generation of such certifications.
One work-around to this problem is to have the issuer, rather than
the potential securities buyer, pay for the certification. This
arrangement creates its own credibility problems, however. To attract
more issuers to purchase its services, the certifier too has incentives
(though, again, perhaps only end-gamed ones) to attract business by
engaging in a light investigation or failing to pass on or account for
some negative information that it does find.
Moreover, it is difficult to design negative legal consequences for
certifiers that incorrectly identify as high-quality securities ones that
are really low quality. Unlike an investment bank, the certifier does not
profit from a successful sale. Unless the certifier takes on the very
different role of being an insurer of all the possible ways that a security
could fall short of what was expected, the certifier’s revenues,
measured on a per-unit-sold basis, will be small. A prospect of high
liability for an erroneous rating may thus drive all certifiers out of the
market. Because of this problem, the liability rules applicable to a
certifier are likely to require a payout of damages only for the most
egregious errors. Thus the certifier, unlike the merchant, may need to
rely primarily on reputation, not vulnerability to legal sanction, as its
source of credibility.
The failure of certifiers to fully solve the securities-offering
information-asymmetry problems has a history. The credit-rating

35. See generally Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, “Low Balling,” and
Disclosure Regulation, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 113 (1981) (suggesting that “low balling” would not
impair auditor independence partly because auditors, in deciding whether to cheat, consider loss
in future audit fees resulting from the loss of reputation).
36. See generally L. McDonald Wakeman, The Real Function of Bond Rating Agencies, 1
CHASE FIN. Q. 18 (1981), reprinted in THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 410
(Clifford W. Smith, Jr. ed., 2d ed. 1990) (suggesting that bond ratings mirrored the market’s
assessment of a bond’s risk partly because bond-rating agencies depend on their reputation to
obtain business).
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scandals in connection with mortgage-backed bonds are still fresh in
our memories.37 To find other examples, we need look back no further
than the scandals in the reporting of corporate financials from the early
2000s to see how problems such as agency problems within the
certifying organization and oligopoly within the industry reduce the
effectiveness of this information-asymmetry antidote.38
D. Buyer Search
Suppose that, contrary to the initial adverse-selection story told
above, some or all the buyers can individually ascertain whether the
particular item that a seller is offering is the high- or low-quality
version of the product but can do so only at a cost. A buyer who acts in
this fashion will be willing to pay her reservation price for an item that
she identifies as high quality, and others can learn something about the
product’s quality from observing her purchase. Search models in
information economics can be complex and depend critically on the
assumptions made, but generally they suggest that a critical factor in
the success of buyer search in ameliorating adverse-selection problems
is the cost to the buyer of “visiting” a seller and testing its product.
The following variation on our ongoing adverse-selection product
example set out above illustrates the point. Assume that any given
seller must choose the price at which it offers all its items to the market;
that is, it engages in a mass offering and cannot price discriminate
among buyers. Also assume that each seller offering the product at any
given price will get the same total number of visits by potential buyers.
A certain percentage of these visitors are testers—persons who, at a
cost to themselves, can ascertain the quality of what the seller is
selling—and the remainder are nontesters. The more expensive testing
is on average, all else equal, the smaller the percentage of the visitors
that are testers. Relative to the nontesters, testers either put a higher
value on the difference between the high- and low-quality product or
can ascertain the difference at less personal cost, perhaps because of
accumulated skill. Finally, assume that there are economies of scale so

37. See John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the “Worldwide Credit Crisis”: The
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and a Proposal for Improvement, 2009 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 109, 120–24 (giving background on the 2008 financial crisis and discussing the role
of credit agencies in how it unfolded).
38. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 108–92 (2006); Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1097–1108 (2008) (book review).
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that in equilibrium it is not worthwhile for a seller to be in business if
the seller does not receive a certain minimum number of buy orders.
Consistent with the original example, a tester is willing to pay one
hundred dollars for an item that her test reveals is high quality and
eighty dollars for an item that her test reveals is low quality. A
nontester is willing to pay a seller the expected value of her purchase.
If testing were sufficiently expensive that no potential tester would
engage in testing and every seller were offering the product to the
market, the potential tester and nontester each would, as in the original
example, know that 50 percent of the sellers are offering the highquality version and 50 percent the low-quality version, but neither set
of potential buyers could tell at an affordable price which is which.
Because the high-quality version is worth one hundred dollars to her
and the low-quality eighty dollars, each buyer would be willing to pay
ninety dollars. Again, however, this is not an equilibrium solution.
Assuming that ninety dollars is below the high-quality sellers’
reservation prices, there will be no sales by high-quality sellers to
nontesters. The same result would prevail if the cost of testing were
somewhat less but sufficiently high that the percentage of visitors that
would find it worthwhile to test is small. The potential number of
purchases from high-quality sellers made by testers would be
sufficiently low that each high-quality seller, for economy-of-scale
reasons, would find it not worthwhile to sell at all. Under these
circumstances, the equilibrium solution would again be the same as in
the original example: no sales of the high-quality version of the
product.
Now suppose that testing is inexpensive. Consider the resulting
change in the nontesters’ expectations in equilibrium. Again, if every
seller were offering the product, as in the original example, the
nontester would know that 50 percent of the sellers are offering the
high-quality version and 50 percent the low-quality version. Again, this
is not an equilibrium situation. With inexpensive testing, testers will be
a much larger portion of the visitors to all sellers, including to the highquality ones, and these testers will be willing to pay the seller of the
high-quality product one hundred dollars per unit. Thus high-quality
sellers may receive enough orders to stay in business at their offer
price. Moreover, the mere fact that a given seller is selling at a high
price and is in business filling orders will suggest to the nontester an
increased possibility that the seller is high quality. Of course, a lowquality seller could try to masquerade as a high-quality one by offering
a similarly high price. But if testing is inexpensive, the masquerader too
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will be visited by many testers, each of whom will be unwilling to buy
at the high price, and, given the economies of scale, the loss of
customers would be too costly for the masquerade to be a successful
strategy. Thus, in equilibrium, nontesters too may think it is likely that
a high-price seller is also a high-quality seller, so that they too are
willing to pay the high price. In other words, if buyer search and testing
are sufficiently inexpensive, they can eliminate the adverse-selection
problem even though not everyone tests.
This example illustrates the importance of institutions, whether
private or public, that reduce the cost of buyer search and testing.
Standardization of the language of seller disclosure, such as the posting
of gasoline mileage calculated in a regulated way on all new autos for
sale, is an example. The value of low-cost search and testing may even
call for standardization limiting the variation of certain characteristics
of the product where the variation is of little or no value to buyers and
makes comparisons more difficult.39
More generally, the fact that in many situations a buyer can reduce
information asymmetries by engaging in search and testing suggests
something about appropriate liability rules. To the extent that such
actions by buyers are the most cost-effective way for these asymmetries
to be reduced, sellers and merchants should be given a defense against
liability actions brought by nontesting buyers based on a claim that the
seller or merchant failed to disclose the discoverable problem in the
product’s quality.40
Applying these models to securities, two particular features of an
offering improve the chances that buyer search can help resolve its
adverse-selection problems. One is that the offering must be at the
same price to all offerees. The other is that some investors each invest
a substantial amount of money in the offering. The more dollars an
investor is seeking to invest, the lower the cost of doing the
investigation per dollar invested. The presence of the large investors
reassures the smaller ones.41

39. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for
Heterogeneous Goods Under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy
Implications, 13 BELL J. ECON. 181, 181–83 (1982) (proposing policy prescriptions after setting
out a model somewhat resembling the example in the text).
40. This concept is comparable to the analysis in accident law to the role of defenses based
on the concept of contributory negligence. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 9–21 (1987).
41. Internet-based solicitations of accredited investors based on Securities Act Rule 506(c),
see infra Part V.B, provide an example. Successful such offerings involve substantial investments
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III. AFFIRMATIVE-DISCLOSURE REGIMES
The story so far can be summarized as follows. When an issuer is
first contemplating a potential public offering of truly new securities,
information asymmetries abound. Unless the adverse-selection effects
from these asymmetries are ameliorated in some fashion, the resulting
discount in price that investors are willing to pay may well make the
offering not worth making. This represents an economic loss to society
if the offering is one that would have proceeded in a world where there
were no such asymmetries. There are several market-based antidotes
that help ameliorate these adverse-selection effects: signaling,
investment bank intermediation, certifiers, and buyer search. These
antidotes are not, either individually or in combination, fully effective
cures to the problem, however. Thus, if we rely on just these solutions,
many worthwhile real investment projects will still not be funded.
This shortfall in adverse-selection amelioration raises the issue as
to whether there is a role for government-based regulation to
supplement what parties can accomplish just using contract and tort
law. Specifically, three questions need to be answered. First, would it
be useful to have a government-designed affirmative-disclosure
regime, whereby an issuer making an offering that is subject to the
regime is required to answer certain questions? Second, if it would be
worthwhile to have such a regime, at least for offerings with particular
characteristics, should the regime be imposed on all issuers making
such offerings or only on those that volunteer to be subjected to it?
Finally, when an issuer or other person associated with an offering
makes a material misstatement in connection with the offering or fails
to properly answer a question imposed by the disclosure regime, should
regulation create for investors one or more causes of action for
damages that go beyond what is available to the investors under tort
law and under the terms of the contracts they enter into with regard to
the offering? The first two of these questions are the topic of this Part,
and the final question is the topic of Part IV.

by well-known angel investors or venture capital firms, and the other investors rely on the
expertise of these substantial investors. Darian M. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for
Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REV. 561, 565 (2015).
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A. The Rationale for an Affirmative-Disclosure Regime at the Time
of the Offering
The signaling model has two key points of failure when applied to
the real world. One is that not all statements that issuers make are fully
credible. The solution to this is straightforward: increase the negative
consequences that result from making false statements. The other is
that investors are unable to interpret the silence of issuers in a way that
permits investors to infer with full accuracy the true situation
concerning what has not been said. The solution to this second point of
failure is an affirmative-disclosure regime. When an issuer is making a
public offering that is subject to an affirmative-disclosure regime, it
must answer certain questions. Requiring an issuer to answer a
question clears up whatever ambiguity would otherwise have arisen if
the issuer had remained silent concerning the matter, at least assuming
the answer is credible.
The basic mechanism of the signaling model is that one can infer
that a bad state of affairs exists from an issuer’s silence about a
particular matter. This is because, according to the model, if the
situation were better, the issuer would say so. Consider, from the
discussion above, some of the reasons why, in the real world, silence
may be ambiguous concerning the actual state of affairs. One reason is
that a bad state of affairs in fact does not exist but the issuer finds that
disclosing the actual good state of affairs is costlier to it than whatever
it would gain in terms of a better price for its securities. As noted above,
this could be the case, for example, where disclosure of the information
would disadvantage the issuer with regard to the terms it can negotiate
with its major suppliers and customers or in terms of its competition
with other firms. Another reason that silence may be ambiguous is that
a low-quality issuer’s silence may only reveal that it is inferior to other
issuers, not how inferior it is. Subjecting the issuer to an affirmativedisclosure regime that includes a question about the matter resolves
ambiguity arising for any of these reasons because the issuer needs to
disclose what the actual state of affairs is.
Moreover, in contrast to the simple signaling models in the
economics literature involving just a single feature of a product, issuers
in the real world possess, or are in a good position through
investigation to discover, a large range of different kinds of information
that can help predict their future cash flows and hence affect the
desirability of their shares. For many of these kinds of information,
most investors will not have the ability to make very accurate negative
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inferences from silence on any given subject. One reason is that they
may lack the necessary sophistication. Another reason may be
bounded rationality. Each of the thousands of issuers in the market
either says something, or remains silent, about each of a myriad of
different matters that might affect its future cash flows. Investors
rationally may be unable to cost-effectively process all the data that
would be needed to make distinctions among all these issuers based on
whether they were silent or said something.42 Finally, investors may be
unable to make the correct inferences from silence because they have
a behavioral tendency not to recognize negative implications of silence
with respect to some of these kinds of information.43 An affirmativedisclosure regime can help correct investors’ inability to make
appropriate negative inferences from silence that arises from any of
these problems. A negative disclosure with respect to a given matter
stands out more than silence with respect to the matter, thereby
making the information more salient.
A rule mandating disclosure of any given kind of information can
also reduce the cost of making distinctions among issuers with respect
to the matter involved by regularizing the language used by all issuers
discussing the matter. Such a rule will thus help an individual investor,
or her advisor, identify more easily which offerings are low quality. It
will also enhance the functioning of one of the other market-based
antidotes to adverse selection: buyer search. By lowering the cost for
potential buyers who do search and test, those investors who do not
search and test are better able to rely, as signals of quality, on the price
established by the actions of investors who do.
B. The Rationale for a Periodic-Disclosure Regime After the Time of
the Offering
Potential investors in an offering by an issuer of truly new
securities are likely to have little knowledge of the capabilities of the
issuer’s managers and their willingness to work hard. Nor will they
have much knowledge of the inclination, if any, of these managers, and
42. Russell Korobkin makes a similar point with respect to the limited capacity of market
forces to police the fine-print terms in consumer contracts because, due to bounded rationality,
consumers cannot absorb, analyze, and act on this information. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206–07
(2003).
43. Id. at 1247–54. This is an application of the more general principle in behavioral
economics of the “what you see is all you get” phenomenon. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN,
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
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of any control shareholders still remaining after the offering, to divert
issuer cash flows to themselves. Disclosure at the time of the offering
can only do so much to reduce the asymmetry between what investors
know and what these insiders know about their own capabilities and
inclinations. The more effective the ongoing constraints are on
managers and control shareholders to act in a way that maximizes the
value of the shares held by outsiders, the less this asymmetry between
the insiders and investors matters. This is because the managers and
any remaining control shareholders may, undisclosed, have less-thanpure motives or poor managerial capabilities, but this fact is less
important for the value of the shares going forward if those insiders are
more constrained. The less important the asymmetry, the fewer stock
sales are blocked that would have occurred absent the asymmetry.
The prospect that an issuer will be subject to an effective ongoing
mandatory issuer-disclosure regime—a regime that requires an issuer
to regularly update its disclosures—can reinforce the constraints that
corporate law and reputational concerns put on diversions. More
generally, there is a general recognition that transparency is necessary
for good corporate governance.44 Such disclosure can reveal failures by
an issuer to follow the procedures, such as an informed independent
director or shareholder vote, for approving transactions in which the
managers or control shareholders have an interest.45 More disclosure,
by making prices more accurate, also makes share-price-based
compensation a more effective device to incentivize managers to act in
a share-value-maximizing way. More ongoing disclosure has an
additional function if the initial public offering (IPO) results in a
sufficient dispersion of share ownership that no control shareholder
remains. Without a control shareholder, there is no one to discipline
the firm’s managers if they are lazy, incompetent, or divert funds to
themselves. Substitute discipline, however, comes from the threat of
hostile takeover or pressure by activist hedge funds. More disclosure
makes these disciplinary mechanisms more effective by making
44. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 29–32 (2004) (proposing that “corporate governance framework should promote
transparent and efficient markets” to effect positive economic performance); Mark J. Roe,
Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 244, 263–69 (2002) (arguing that corporate
transparency facilitates the separation of ownership from control).
45. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS, WALL
STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 31–32, 104 (2016) (explaining the
importance of SEC mandatory-disclosure rules for reducing such self-interested behavior by
managers and control shareholders); Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions
of Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 808 (2001) (same).
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management shortcomings more evident to the market and by
reducing the risk associated with purchasing a substantial block of
shares. The existence of more effective disciplinary devices incentivizes
managers not to misbehave in the first place, and facilitates managerial
replacement when it nevertheless does occur.46
C. Mandatory Versus Optional Initial Offering and OngoingDisclosure Regimes
For the issuers adopting it, a system that makes available for
voluntary adoption a regime asking certain questions will be just as
effective at resolving the signaling model’s ambiguity of silence as an
identical disclosure regime system that is mandatorily imposed on all
issuers. Moreover, if issuers have a choice of multiple regimes, a
voluntary system could have the advantage of promoting regulatory
competition. With such competition, regulators might be spurred to
find the set of questions that most effectively reduces adverse selection
while imposing on the issuers the least costs in terms of providing the
disclosure.47 Alternatively, the different competing regimes might
provide issuers with a menu of choices where one regime would be
most effective for one type of issuer and another regime more effective
for another type of issuer.48 Indeed, the disclosure regime need not
even be governmentally based, as proposals to use stock exchanges
instead illustrate.49 A governmentally run regime will have advantages,
however, in terms of the powers of investigation of any centralized
enforcer and the capacity to impose strict sanctions for violations.
Still, a voluntary system is likely, from a social-welfare point of
view, to be undersubscribed and require less than the optimal level of
disclosure. For reasons discussed below, an issuer will decide whether
to sign onto such a regime based on its calculations of the private costs
and private benefits that will arise from the disclosure that the regime

46. All of these points are worked out in more detail in Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at
258–59.
47. Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2365–72 (1998).
48. Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 922–24 (1998); Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 231–32 (1996).
49. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions
with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999) (proposing an exchangeadministered enforcement regime for fraud-on-the-market claims).
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requires. However, its private costs are likely to be higher than the
social costs of this disclosure and its private benefits are likely to be less
than the social benefits. In addition, if not all issuers in a market are
subject to a disclosure regime, there will not be as much reduction in
the cost of making distinctions among issuers. Thus the costs of
individual investor decisionmaking are reduced less and the adverseselection-ameliorating benefits of buyer search and testing will not be
as great. When issuers can choose from among multiple disclosure
regimes, similar problems arise.50
1. Private Costs of Issuer Disclosure Exceed Social Costs. For each
individual issuer, a disclosure involves two different kinds of costs:
“operational” costs and “interfirm” costs. Operational costs are the
out-of-pocket expenses and the diversions of management and staff
time that issuers incur to provide the information. Interfirm costs arise
from the fact that the information provided can put the issuer at a
disadvantage relative to its competitors, major suppliers, and major
customers.
Operational costs are costs both to the individual firm and to
society as a whole. Interfirm costs are costs only to the individual firm.
They are not social costs because of an externality: the disadvantages
to the issuer from the disclosure are counterbalanced by the
advantages it confers on the other firms. Thus, at all levels of
disclosure, an issuer’s private marginal cost of disclosure will exceed
the marginal social cost by an amount equal to these interfirm costs
associated with any particular disclosure level.
2. Social Benefits of Issuer Disclosure Exceed Private Benefits.
Information disclosed by one issuer does not just reduce information
asymmetries with respect to its own offering. The information can be
useful as well in analyzing other issuers and thus reducing the
consequences of information asymmetries for the offerings of the other
issuers. It can also improve the liquidity of secondary trading in
securities of other issuers by reducing information asymmetries among
the traders in that market. In addition, by making share prices of these
other issuers more accurate and making the environment in which they
are operating as firms more transparent, it can make more effective the

50. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (discussing benefits and costs
of mandatory regulation of disclosures, nonregulation, and issuer choice regimes).
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constraints on their managers to operate their firms in a share-valuemaximizing way in the same way that their own firm’s disclosures do.51
One issuer’s disclosures could, for example, reveal something about
possible trends for the industry as a whole and thus help clarify the
extent to which the performance of each of the issuer’s competitors was
due to its managers’ efforts versus the state of the larger market.52 The
disclosing issuer’s share price can only capture the resulting reduction
in the adverse-selection-induced discount and expectations of its
improved liquidity and share-value-maximizing managerial behavior.
It cannot capture the similar reductions in the adverse-selectioninduced discount enjoyed by other issuers resulting from the first
issuer’s disclosures, nor the improvements in the secondary-market
liquidity of the securities of these other issuers or in their corporate
governance. Therefore, the private benefit to the disclosing issuer will
be less than the social benefit.
3. Impact on Issuer Disclosure Behavior. Because an issuer’s
disclosure involves both social costs and social benefits, each issuer has
some socially optimal level of disclosure, where the marginal social cost
equals the marginal social benefit. Unregulated, however, an issuer will
choose the level of disclosure where the marginal private cost equals
the marginal private benefit. Because the issuer’s private costs of
disclosure exceed the social costs and its private benefits fall short of
the social benefits, the issuer’s choice will be below the socially optimal
level of disclosure.53 With a mandatory-disclosure regime that sets the
required disclosure level at the higher socially optimal level, any one
issuer must disclose more than is privately optimal, but this issuer will
benefit from the additional disclosure of all the other issuers in the
market because they are also being subject to the same mandate.

51. See supra Part III.B.
52. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 685.
53. I have considered in more detail elsewhere the divergence of the private and social costs
and benefits of issuer disclosure and the consequent tendency of unregulated issuers to disclose
below their socially optimal level. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing
Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2532–51 (1997); see also Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490–91 (1992) (explaining that, if left to states, the laws
passed would likely produce less disclosure in the United States); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 28, at 684–85 (discussing voluntary disclosure); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice
of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 846–74 (1995) (discussing the history of
disclosure in the United States).
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This private-versus-social cost consideration is a powerful reason
for imposing mandatory periodic disclosure on publicly traded
corporate issuers because of the corporate governance and liquidity
enhancement benefits to corporate issuers as a group that result from
the increased overall level of disclosure.54 Derivatively, it argues for
imposing the same regime on new corporate issuers as they join the
group of publicly traded issuers at the time of an IPO.55
IV. MANDATED LIABILITY TERMS
Absent a regulatory intervention, the question of liability of
issuers, issuer directors and officers, underwriters, dealers, and experts
such as accountants or rating agencies for misstatements and omissions
of required disclosures will be determined by tort law and the terms of
the contracts these various parties enter into with regard to the
offering. These contracts will also determine the standards for
imposing such liability with regard to questions of fault, due diligence,
and burdens of evidentiary persuasion. As a general matter, a
contractual representation is a warranty. When the representation
turns out to be false, the party who has made it is liable, without any
need for the claimant to show fault.56 Only the counterparty to whom
the claim was made can be a claimant, however. As for any other
actions based on a false statement of one of the offering participants,
the tort of deceit requires, among other things, that the claimant show
that the statement was made with scienter and that the claimant relied

54. I discuss these points in more detail elsewhere. See Fox, Civil Liability, supra note 1, at
253–67.
55. In comparing a system where an issuer can choose its disclosure regime with a mandatory
system, the argument for a mandatory approach is in one respect weaker in the case of a firm just
going public than in the case of one that is already publicly traded and has a dispersed ownership
structure. The insiders of a firm that is just going public are selling their shares in the offering
and/or diluting their continuing share ownership in the company. Thus, if they are allowed to
choose their disclosure regime, they will have an interest in choosing the regime that yields the
highest share price. Because they make their decision based on the issuer’s private costs and
benefits, the required level of disclosure of the regime that they choose will, for the reasons
discussed in the text, be lower than what is socially optimal. There is, however, at least a floor set
by the insiders’ desire to maximize share price. The managers of an already public firm, in
contrast, may well choose a regime that requires even less disclosure than would the regime that
would yield the highest share price. The less the market knows about what is going on inside the
firm, the more protection the managers have against hostile takeover and the pressures on
managers brought by activist hedge funds. The managers may well find that this added protection
is worth more to them than whatever they are giving up due to a lower share price.
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating that
a contract is voidable if assent was induced by material misrepresentation, even absent fraud).
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on the statement in deciding to purchase the security.57 The issue
addressed here is what considerations might justify regulatory
intervention to alter this basic scheme.
A. The Rationale for Imposing Liability on Operating Corporate
Issuers
The rationales for a mandatory-disclosure regime set out just
above imply that the regime should call for a higher level of disclosure
than would occur if the private parties were left to contract disclosure
terms on their own and to rely on contract and tort law remedies to
police misrepresentations. These mandatory-disclosure rules will not
accomplish their purpose if they are not complied with. Issuer liability
is one way to encourage compliance. Because the parties would not
agree on their own to terms requiring the higher level of disclosure
called for by the mandatory regime, they also cannot be expected to
agree to socially cost-effective terms concerning compliance-inducing
issuer liability when this level of disclosure is not provided.
The analysis of issuer liability must be seen in light of the ideal set
out earlier: assuring, to the extent practicable and cost-effective, that
all available information is reflected in price. When this happens,
society’s scarce savings are steered to the proposed real investment
projects in the economy that available knowledge suggests are the most
promising.58
Consider the situation where the total available information
known by insiders of the firm, including its nonpublic information,
suggests that its proposed real investment project is not a good use of
the economy’s scarce savings, given the greater promise of proposed
projects of other firms. If the information possessed by insiders is
disclosed, its offering’s prospective market price would be sufficiently
low that the proceeds would be less than the discounted present value
of additional payouts that the firm would need to make later due to the
share dilution (or additional debt service) resulting from the additional
securities outstanding. Thus, the issuer will not proceed with the
offering and will not invest in the project. Doing so would reduce the
value of the firm.59

57. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN D. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed. 1984).
58. See supra Part I.D.
59. For a general discussion of discounted present value and the comparative opportunity
costs of risky investments, see BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 16, at 16–17.

FOX IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 3:27 PM

704

[Vol. 66:673

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

The issuer may be tempted, however, not to disclose whatever is
negative in the information possessed by the insiders, or even to make
false positive statements. If it does not disclose the negative
information or makes false positive statements, it may be able to get a
high enough price in a securities offering to make the offering and the
investment in the unpromising project worthwhile. The prospect of
liability reduces or eliminates this temptation because it would require
the issuer to return to investors the amount by which the offering price
was inflated due to the violation of the disclosure rules.60
B. The Choice of Liability Regime for the Issuer
The question remains what the nature of this issuer liability
scheme should be. One possibility is an absolute strict issuer liability
regime, as is in fact imposed on issuers pursuant to Section 11(a) of the
Securities Act for disclosure violations in offerings subject to Section 5
registration. Another is absolute issuer liability with a defense if the
top officials of the issuer engaged in adequate due diligence. This is
similar to the liability scheme under Sections 11(a) and 11(b) of the
Securities Act currently imposed on the officials themselves and on
underwriters. A third possibility is scienter-based issuer liability, where
liability is imposed on the issuer only if the plaintiff investor proves
that the top officials were aware of the information or were highly
reckless in not knowing of it. This is the liability scheme under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act,61 the only federal60. See Forsythe et al., supra note 19, at 482–84 (discussing experimental evidence that an
absence of sanctions for false claims can lead investors to purchase inferior securities). Section
11(e) of the Securities Act provides a somewhat different damages formula, in essence giving the
plaintiff a prima facie case for the difference between the price paid and the price at time of suit.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2012). The defendant has the burden of proving what damages would be under
the formula suggested in the text. Id. The defendant enjoys a reduction in the prima facie measure
of damages only to the extent that it can make this showing. Id.
61. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206–14 (1976) (declining to extend liability
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act to include negligent conduct). Although there
is not complete agreement among the federal circuits as to which individual or individuals within
a corporation’s organization need to possess knowledge of facts that render the corporation’s
statement false or misleading for the statement to constitute a Rule 10b-5 violation by the
corporation, the focus of most courts tends to be on the top officials. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, affirmed the dismissal of a complaint against an issuer because insufficient evidence was
alleged that the CEO, who spoke the alleged misstatement, knew the information rendering it
false. See In re Apple Comput., Inc., 127 F. App’x 296, 303 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A corporation is
deemed to have the requisite scienter for fraud only if the individual corporate officer making the
statement has the requisite level of scienter at the time that he or she makes the statement.” (citing
Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435–36 (9th Cir. 1995))). Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit has stated
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securities-law bases for a damages suit against an issuer when the sale
of securities by an issuer involving a misstatement is neither registered
under the Securities Act nor made pursuant to Regulation A+.62
1. What Constitutes an Omission or a False or Misleading Statement
of Fact? The starting point in the analysis of this question is to note
that, whichever liability scheme is chosen, a necessary condition is the
existence of a violation of the disclosure regime’s rules by the issuer.
This requires that material information required to be disclosed was in
fact not disclosed, or that the issuer made a statement covered by the
disclosure regime that was materially false or misleading. In other
words, at the time of the offering, someone in the world must have
possessed material information that was either omitted contrary to the
rules or that renders false or misleading some affirmative statement by
the issuer. Such knowledge, if it is known by someone in the world,
would normally be possessed by at least some individuals within the
issuer’s organization. The fact that this information is deemed material
means, according to the standard definition, that there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in
deciding whether to buy, sell, or hold the issuer’s shares.63 If the issuer
has properly functioning channels of internal intelligence, information
of this importance would likely become available to the top officials of
the issuer in the ordinary course of day-to-day business. These top
officials are ultimately responsible for the content of the issuer’s
disclosures in connection with the offering. For example, under the
Securities Act registration procedures, these officials are required to
sign the statement.64
For purposes of determining whether a statement made by the corporation was made
by it with the requisite Rule 10(b) scienter we believe it appropriate to look to the state
of mind of the individual corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement
(or order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who furnish information or
language for inclusion therein, or the like) rather than generally to the collective
knowledge of all the corporation’s officers and employees acquired in the course of
their employment.
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols. Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).
62. See infra Parts V.B–C.
63. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
64. Section 11 imposes absolute liability also on these top officials, subject to a due-diligence
defense. In applying this statutory scheme, however, the courts have acted in a way consistent
with the view in the text that all material information about the issuer has very likely been made
available to its top officials. The courts almost conclusively presume that an issuer’s top officials
know such information despite the theoretical availability of a due-diligence defense. See Feit v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577–78 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (explaining how
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2. Comparing Strict Absolute Liability to Scienter-Based Liability.
Consider first an issuer liability scheme whereby liability is only
imposed on the issuer if some relevant top official has scienter with
respect to this information, in essence the Rule 10b-5 damages action
scheme. This liability scheme has three distinct disadvantages relative
to absolute strict issuer liability. First, a scienter requirement creates
incentives to distort the functioning of an issuer’s channels of internal
intelligence so as to keep its top officials from receiving information
that indicates that a planned offering’s disclosures violate the
disclosure rules. The benefit to the issuer is that, with the top officials
in the dark, the issuer could violate the rules free of any liability and be
able to keep the gains from the resulting inflated price of its offering.
Such distorted channels of internal intelligence, however, will
obviously degrade the issuer’s ability to make efficient operating and
real investment decisions as a firm. Hence they will damage the overall
efficiency of the economy.
Second, to the extent that such distorted channels succeed in
protecting top officers from information, an offering that might not be
worthwhile at a price that reflects this information can proceed without
its disclosure. As a result, the economy’s scarce savings will be
misallocated to an inferior investment project.
Third, a liability system for top officials requiring a showing of
scienter significantly expands the range of facts that will be in
contention in litigation because it introduces the additional issue of
who knew what. This increases the amount of society’s scarce resources
that will be consumed by each side in any case where suit is brought.
Moreover, with the plaintiff investor facing higher costs if she brings a
suit, a disclosure violation is less likely to trigger such suit. The
resulting diminished likelihood that the issuer will have to pay damages
reduces deterrence.65

insider directors are presumed to have greater knowledge of corporate affairs, making it almost
impossible for them to establish a due-diligence defense); Ernest L. Folk, III, Civil Liabilities
Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REV. 1, 22, 30–38 (1969).
65. Absolute strict liability, in making suits easier to bring, will also increase the number of
suits where, despite an issuer having a properly functioning intelligence system, the top
management in fact did not know the relevant information. In such a situation, the prospect of
liability would have no influence on behavior and hence no deterrence value. The additional
social resources expended by the parties in such actions would thus serve no useful social purpose.
The analysis in the text suggests that such situations will be rare, however, and so the gain from
increased deterrence is the more important consequence of suits being easier to bring.
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3. Comparing Strict Absolute Liability to Absolute Liability with a
Due-Diligence Defense. Absolute strict issuer liability also has
advantages relative to a second possible liability standard—strict issuer
liability with a defense available when the issuer can show that its top
officials engaged in adequate due diligence66—though the advantages
are fewer than when the comparison is with scienter-based liability. A
more detailed analysis of the operation of such a due-diligence defense
follows in connection with the discussion below of underwriter
liability.67 A couple of observations with regard to its operation when
applied to the issuer are appropriate here, however. Unlike scienterbased issuer liability, allowing the issuer a due-diligence defense would
not likely create incentives to distort the functioning of an issuer’s
channels of internal intelligence. This is because credible evidence that
a firm distorted its channels of communication to keep its top officials
in the dark would prevent the firm from being able to maintain the duediligence defense and thus the firm would be absolutely liable anyway.
On the other hand, allowing the defense would still enlarge the range
of facts that will be in contention in litigation, thereby increasing the
social resources that will be expended by each side in any case where
suit is brought and reducing deterrence by making suits costlier for
plaintiff investors to bring. Relative to requiring plaintiffs to show
scienter, however, these effects would be modest because the defense
would be difficult to maintain given the likelihood that the top officers
would find out the information in the ordinary course of business.
C. The Rationale for Underwriter Liability
Even if an issuer is subject to absolute strict liability and it is
costless for a plaintiff investor to bring a suit for damages on any
occasion where an issuer engaging in a securities offering violates the
mandatory-disclosure rules, deterrence would not be fully effective.
One reason is that the undisclosed information that makes the offering
statement disclosures in violation of the rules often relates to the
possibility of an event that ultimately bankrupts the issuer, particularly
an issuer publicly offering truly new securities. Bankruptcy can render
the issuer partially or totally judgment-proof. Another is that the

66. Absolute liability subject to a due-diligence defense is in fact essentially the liability
scheme for issuers in connection with Regulation A+ offerings pursuant to Securities Act Section
3(b)(2)(D), which, in turn, imposes the liability scheme set out under Section 12(a)(2). See 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(D) (2012).
67. See infra Part IV.D.
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issuer’s agents, including its top officials, may engage in a kind of
“emphasis on the positive” or “keep the boss happy” groupthink. As a
result, even where relevant information is available to the top
managers, it is downplayed. Hence the top managers become blinded
to its importance and thus to the liability that would flow from its
nondisclosure.
The rationale for adding underwriter liability to the scheme starts
with the fact again that a disclosure violation can allow a public offering
to proceed that otherwise would not, with the resulting misallocation
of society’s scarce savings.68 As developed below, underwriter liability
can help make up for these two sources of shortfall in the ability of
issuer liability to deter such violations. In the stages leading up to a
public offering, the underwriter is in a much better position to discover
information related to potential disclosure violations by an issuer than
are the prospective investors. The prospect that the underwriter will
face liability for investor losses if it is aware of such undisclosed
information will likely lead the underwriter to force the issuer to
disclose it. If the issuer does not comply, the underwriter is likely to
refuse to proceed with the offering. The expected cost of participating
in the offering without the disclosure is just too high. Just as with issuer
liability, the conclusion that the parties would not, on their own,
negotiate the socially justified higher level of disclosure called for by
the mandatory rules also implies that they cannot be counted on to
negotiate socially cost-effective terms with regard to complianceinducing underwriter liability.69
1. Issuer Bankruptcy. Assume, as happens not infrequently, that
information exists suggesting the possibility of an event that, if it
occurs, will bankrupt the issuer. Assume also that the increased
likelihood of bankruptcy suggested by the information is sufficiently
great that the information would be considered material and its
nondisclosure would violate the disclosure regime’s rules. Not
disclosing the information would inflate the price at which the
securities could be sold. Both the issuer’s top management and the
underwriter know the information, and each will act rationally in the
face of whatever liability regime it faces.
With these assumptions in mind, consider a regime where the
underwriter is potentially liable as well as the issuer. Relative to the
68. See supra Part I.D.
69. See supra Part IV.A.
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issuer, the underwriter has less to gain, and, if liable, more to lose on
an expected basis, from the nondisclosure of this information. In terms
of gain, the underwriter’s percentage commission is just a small fraction
of the sales price of the offering and thus it gets only a small fraction of
the violation’s inflation in price; all the rest of the sales-price inflation
goes to the issuer.70 In terms of loss, at the time that the issuer officials
are deciding whether to make the offering without disclosing the
information, they know that if the event ultimately does not occur, the
issuer will enjoy the upside of a more favorable price. If the event
ultimately does occur, the issuer will be judgment-proof and thus will
not be able to pay investors the damages assessed against it in litigation.
On an expected basis, the issuer may thus rationally find it
worthwhile to make the offering without disclosing the information.
The calculation of the underwriter is much different. Its upside, if the
event does not occur, is only the small fraction of the inflation in the
offering price. If the event does occur and the issuer becomes
judgment-proof, the underwriter will be liable for the full amount. The
underwriter is much more likely to be good for the judgment and thus
required to pay. This is because the underwriter is likely to start off
well capitalized and subject to a more diversified set of risks. So, its net
worth usually will be at most only mildly affected by the event that
bankrupted the issuer. In sum, even based just on the calculations
considered so far and assuming that the underwriter does in fact know
the information, making the underwriter liable in addition to the issuer
can significantly add to the likelihood that the information will be
disclosed.
2. Issuer Irrationality. Now consider an additional source of issuerliability-deterrence shortfall: the possibility that the issuer’s top
officials, despite having the relevant information available to them, do
not rationally perceive the violations imbedded in their planned
disclosures and the future liabilities that these violations would
engender. As a consequence, with only issuer liability, these officials
might proceed with the offering without disclosure even though this is
not the rational share-value-maximizing decision. Agents of the
underwriter are from an organization separate from that of the issuer.

70. This is so even if compliance with the disclosure rules would make the offered securities
look sufficiently less attractive that the offering would not proceed at all, in which case the
underwriter would lose the small fraction of what the total offering amount would be sold for with
the breach, whereas the issuer would lose the whole rest of the value of the deal to it.
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This is important from a behavioral and group-dynamics point of view
because persons who are members of a single organization, including
those near or at the top, are prone to engage in “emphasis on the
positive” or “keep the boss happy” groupthink.71 This is a danger when
an issuer is going through the group decision process of deciding the
disclosures to provide in connection with a securities offering. The
underwriter’s agents are outside the issuer organization and are less
likely to be trapped by this tendency. Thus they are better able to
appreciate the liability implications of available information. Also, the
process of generating a registration statement involves dialogue among
many different people from the underwriter’s and issuer’s
organizations. Agents of the underwriter, because they are not part of
the issuer’s hierarchy, will feel freer to pose hard questions to the
issuer’s top officials than do more junior individuals within the issuer’s
own organization.72
D. The Choice of Liability Regime for Underwriters
Again there is the question of what the nature of this underwriter
liability scheme should be: scienter-based liability, strict absolute
liability, or absolute liability with a due-diligence defense.
1. Scienter-Based Liability Versus Strict Liability With or Without
a Due-Diligence Defense. As with issuer liability, scienter-based
underwriter liability has distinct disadvantages relative to the other two
possible regimes. First, scienter-based underwriter liability less
effectively counteracts the shortfalls in the deterrence value of issuer
liability. This is because, under such a scheme, the underwriter is less
likely to face liability in situations where issuer-liability deterrence has
failed. If a plaintiff investor does bring suit, the underwriter will escape
liability unless the plaintiff can affirmatively prove that the underwriter

71. See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF
FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 197–98 (1972). Donald Langevoort, in his recent
book, emphasizes the capacity of a firm to irrationally underestimate the negative future
consequences of disclosure violations because of the tendency of people to engage in selfdeception in situations of ambiguity, the tendency for overconfident people to make it to top
managerial positions, and pressures at all levels to accentuate the positives that inevitably arise
from the development of team cohesion. LANGEVOORT, supra note 44, at 28, 36, 40–41.
72. See id. at 88. The view that the underwriter can enhance compliance with the disclosure
rules by playing a somewhat adverse, devil’s advocate role vis-à-vis the issuer has deep roots in
the jurisprudence of liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. See, e.g., Feit v. Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581–82 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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was aware of the information the nondisclosure of which renders the
issuer’s offering materials in violation of the rules. Even if the
underwriter did know the information, the plaintiff may not be able to
prove this fact because of difficulties in obtaining the relevant
evidence. Moreover, because the requirement adds to the cost of the
plaintiff investor bringing suit, fewer suits will be brought. Second,
under a scienter-based underwriter liability regime, an underwriter will
not face liability if it in fact had not learned the information.
Beyond this, and most seriously, a scienter-based regime actually
creates a disincentive for the underwriter to engage in due diligence in
which, because of a concern with its reputation, it would otherwise
have engaged. This is because in a scienter-based liability system, the
underwriter cannot be liable for what it does not find out.
2. Strict Liability With or Without a Due-Diligence Defense. The
foregoing discussion suggests that strict underwriter liability with or
without a due-diligence defense is preferable to scienter-based
underwriter liability. But which form of strict liability is preferable?
a. Assuming a Costless, Error-Free Determination of the DueDiligence Defense. If the underwriter is strictly liable and is allowed no
due-diligence defense, rationally it will perform due diligence up to the
point at which, at the margin, the cost of expending additional effort is
greater than the resulting decrease in expected damages as the result
of an investor suit. As we have seen, the measure of these damages is,
roughly, the inflation in the offering’s price as a result of the offering
document’s misstatement or omission.73 In other words, the
underwriter will keep looking for possible problems until the point
where the cost of further search is greater than its assessment of (x) the
probability, based on what it has found so far, of finding additional, as
yet undetected, problems, multiplied by (y) the amount by which the
disclosure violations associated with these additional possible
problems would inflate the price of the offering. The underwriter
would be faced with what information economists refer to as an
optimal-stopping problem.74

73. See supra Part IV.B.
74. The optimal stopping problem concerns when it is the optimal time to take a certain
action, in this case to stop looking for possible problems. For an application of optimal stopping
in a somewhat different legal context, see Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure,
and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 697–
700 (1985).
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What would be the effect of providing such an underwriter with a
defense if it can show that it engaged in a reasonable due-diligence
effort? This is the regime under the Securities Act for registered public
offerings, where Section 11(a) imposes absolute liability on the
underwriter and Section 11(b) modifies this by allowing the
underwriter the affirmative defense that it engaged in a reasonable
investigation and reasonably believed there was no disclosure
violation.
The first point to note is that a rational underwriter will expend
the same level of effort with or without the defense if the determination
of whether the defense was met could be made through costless and
perfectly accurate adjudication. To see this, first consider the position
of an underwriter where the defense is available. Because the standard
for the investigation is reasonableness, the underwriter is entitled to be
free of liability if it expends effort in due diligence at least up to the
point that, at the margin, additional effort will cost the underwriter
more than the expected improvement in the wealth position of
investors through the disclosure of additional problems that would
inflate the price that investors need to pay if not disclosed.75 It would
be irrational for an underwriter to expend less effort than what meets
the reasonableness standard. If it does expend less effort, the defense
will not be available and so it will be absolutely liable and face expected
costs of liability—damages equal to the amount by which the
nondisclosure of the undetected problem inflates price—that are
greater than the costs of the additional effort that would detect the
problem. On the other side, it would also be irrational for the
underwriter to expend, at least for fear-of-liability reasons, more effort
than what meets the reasonableness standard because doing so is not
necessary to avoid liability.

75. Section 11(c) of the Securities Act, for example, provides that “the standard of
reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property.”
15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (2012). This implies some kind of cost-benefit analysis: a prudent man would
not, at the margin, spend more on investigation than the expected value of the poor returns that
would be avoided by not purchasing assets the inferiority of which would only be revealed by
more intense investigation. This point is affirmed by the holding in In re Software Toolworks, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1489, 1496–1500 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 38 F.3d 1078
(9th Cir. 1994), amended by 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1995), which granted summary judgment to
underwriters with respect to certain misstatements, the falsity of which could have been
ascertained with more intensive due diligence, but where the court found no issue of fact that the
underwriter did not make reasonable efforts. Similarly, the court in BarChris stated in dicta that
accountants need not be held to a standard higher than that of their profession. BarChris, 283 F.
Supp. at 703.
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Now consider the position of the underwriter if the defense were
not available. It would again be irrational to do less than the standard
for exactly the same reason: it will be absolutely liable and the costs of
a more thorough investigation are less than the amount of expected
liability that the more thorough investigation would avoid. And it
would be irrational to do more than the standard because, although the
underwriter now will be liable for undetected problems even if its
investigation meets the reasonableness standard, the expected costs of
liability from these more hidden problems are less than the costs of the
additional effort needed to detect them.
In sum, under the assumption that the determination of the duediligence defense is costless and error-free, the underwriter will expend
the same level of effort in due diligence with or without a due-diligence
defense. Thus, in the choice as to whether or not to permit underwriters
a due-diligence defense, the fear that, absent the defense, underwriters
will expend too much effort searching for problems that are too
insignificant or too unlikely to be worth the trouble would not be a
good reason for providing the defense.76
b. Taking Account of the Cost of Determining the Due-Diligence
Defense and the Chance of Judicial Error. A significant consideration
against providing the due-diligence defense to underwriters relates to
the real-world facts that there are costs that come from enlarging the
range of facts that will be in contention in litigation and that there is a
possibility of judicial error in their determination. Again, enlarging the
range of facts in contention means that each side will consume more of
society’s scarce resources in battle. Also, because a plaintiff investor’s
cost of bringing suit is higher, the underwriter is less likely to face suit
even when it did fail to perform a reasonable investigation. With the
resulting reduction in the underwriter’s expected damages payments if
it fails to perform a reasonable investigation, the underwriter will not
have as strong incentives to act in the ways that counteract the
shortfalls in the deterrence value of issuer liability.
The possibility of legal error further weakens these incentives. The
underwriter, when deciding how much due-diligence effort to make,
knows that a court may find that its investigation was sufficient to meet
76. The foregoing discussion shows that the underwriter will engage in the optimal amount
of search with absolute strict liability. It will engage in the same amount of diligence under a strictliability regime with a due-diligence defense if the determination of whether the defense is met
can be costlessly adjudicated free of error. If this determination is not costless or error-free, the
availability of the defense will, as discussed below, reduce the amount of diligence.
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the defense when in fact it was not. If this happens, the underwriter will
not have to pay damages. Relative to a strict absolute liability regime,
the possibility of this error reduces the expected cost of failing to
conduct an adequate investigation. Thus, it reduces the incentives to
conduct such an investigation. Of course, the court also might err in the
other way and find that the investigation was not sufficient when in fact
it was. That possibility, however, simply puts the issuer in the same
position as if it did not have the defense.
c. Absolute Strict Liability Ties a Due-Diligence and an Insurance
Function. There is also a significant consideration in favor of providing
the due-diligence defense, however. Without the defense, some firms
will be inefficiently discouraged from being in the underwriting
business because providing underwriting services would require tying
together two rather different businesses. One is the investigation of
issuers and merchandising of securities—traditional functions of
investment banks. The other business is insuring investors against risks
that exist but are not worth searching out to eliminate—what we might
call the “pure insurance” business. Even though, in a competitive
equilibrium, any potential underwriter would be able to pass on to
investors the expected payouts for this pure insurance, some such
potential underwriters, although well suited to provide investigation
and merchandising services, are not well suited to perform the pure
insurance business. Being well suited to provide the pure insurance
business would require quite different firm qualities: some
combination of substantial capital on hand to cover years where actual
aggregate payouts exceed the level of expected payouts and a large
scale of operations in terms of the number of offerings underwritten so
that, through the law of large numbers, its actual aggregate annual
payouts would be very unlikely to deviate sharply from the expected
level of payouts.
d. Conclusion. It is hard to know for certain whether, for offerings
by ordinary operating corporate issuers, the favorable or the
unfavorable considerations with respect to the defense predominate. It
should be noted, however, that the concerns about costs and legal error
associated with providing the defense are softened by the nature of the
facts in contention. The primary issue before a court will not be
whether the underwriter knew the information that rendered the
issuer’s offering disclosures in violation of the rules but what the
underwriter did to conduct its investigation. Such conduct is relatively
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easily ascertainable and objectively measurable, which reduces both
the cost of having them in contention and the likelihood of judicial
error.
V. REFORMS AIMED AT SMALLER CORPORATE ISSUERS
Parts I–IV of this Article go back to first principles to answer a
number of questions. First, should the government provide a system of
disclosure regulation at the time of the offering of truly new securities
and thereafter, and if so, under what circumstances? Second, if there is
such a regulatory regime, should it be mandatory or should an issuer
be able to choose whether to be subject to it? Third, which participants
in the offering, if any, should be held civilly liable for damages if, at the
time of the offering, there were misstatements or omissions of required
disclosures? Fourth, for any participant that is liable, what should the
standard be? This final Part applies what has been learned to evaluate
the contemporary legal treatment of public offerings of truly new
securities in the United States.
Traditionally, essentially all offerings of truly new securities that
would be considered “public” as the term is used here77 were subject to
the disclosure-oriented registration process under Section 5 of the
Securities Act. Exemptions from this registration process were
available for certain offerings based on such factors as the limited
number of offerees; the sophistication, wealth, and prior knowledge
about the issuer held by the offerees; and the amount being raised. But
in general the exempted offerings would not be considered public in
this sense.
Compliance with this regulatory scheme is expensive and involves
fixed-cost elements that mean that there are considerable economies
of scale in terms of offering size. Typically, the smaller the firm, the
smaller the scale of the proposed project that it seeks to fund. So, when
a smaller firm contemplates a public offering of truly new securities to
fund such a project, the size of the offering that it can plausibly justify
is likely to be smaller. The smaller the size of the offering, the greater
the cost per dollar raised for compliance with the traditional regulatory
structure. In sum, the smaller the size of the firm, the less likely it is
that a public offering of truly new securities will be an economically
sensible way of raising capital. Concern that most firms below a certain
size cannot practically use a public offering of truly new securities as a

77. See supra Introduction.
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means of raising capital has led in recent years to the development of
alternative, more lenient regimes for certain kinds of public offerings,
culminating with Rule 506(c) and Regulation A+ and the
crowdfunding rules.
As will be developed below, aspects of these reforms seem illadvised. The main features of the Section 5 registration process adhere
closely to what is called for by the first-principles analysis in Parts I–
IV, whereas certain important features of these alternative regimes do
not.
A. The Section 5 Registration Process
The traditional Section 5 registration process, combined with its
civil-liability provisions under Section 11, has four core components.
First, rather than relying on signaling backed by scienter-based liability
for material misstatements, the regime requires issuers to affirmatively
answer a set of questions. Second, this regime is mandatorily applied
to all securities offerings not explicitly exempted. Third, the issuer, by
conducting a registered IPO, automatically becomes subject to the
Exchange Act’s mandatory ongoing periodic-disclosure regime as well.
Fourth, in the event that the registration statement contains a
disclosure violation,78 the issuer is faced with strict absolute liability,
and the underwriter is faced with absolute liability subject to an
affirmative due-diligence defense.79 These core elements thus largely
correspond with what the analysis in Parts I–IV suggest would be
optimal.
B. Rule 506(c) Offerings
Rule 506(c),80 promulgated by the SEC in 201381 pursuant to a
mandate under the JOBS Act enacted in 2012,82 allows any issuer to
78. Securities Act Section 11(a) provides, without qualification, that each person signing the
registration statement is liable if it contains a material misstatement or omission. The issuer is one
of the required signatories. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
79. Securities Act Section 11(a) provides, without qualification, that an offering’s
underwriters are liable if the registration statement contains a material misstatement or omission,
but Section 11(b) provides that notwithstanding 11(a), an underwriter will not be liable if it can
sustain a due-diligence defense. Id. § 77k(b).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
81. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 2013) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
230, 239, 242).
82. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126 Stat.
206, 315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d).
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make a public offering of truly new securities without going through
the traditional Securities Act registration process. Most commentators
have not fully grasped how potentially revolutionary this exemption is.
1. Required Structure of the Offering. The exemption from
registration has remarkably few restrictions and a Rule 506(c) offering
is less burdened by regulation than a traditional one in a number of
ways. The issuer may engage in a general solicitation to raise an
unlimited amount of money from an unlimited number of investors as
long as it takes reasonable steps to verify that each actual purchaser is
an “accredited investor.” In general, an individual qualifies as an
accredited investor if she has an income of at least $200,000 or net
assets (not including her primary residence) of at least $1 million.83
Because most of the individually held stock in the country is held by
such persons, this restriction does not cut out a substantial amount of
potential demand that would have been present with a registered
offering.84 Rule 506(c) has no affirmative disclosure obligations
associated with it, and an offering under the rule does not trigger an
obligation to provide ongoing periodic disclosure. The issuer is subject
only to scienter-based liability under Rule 10b-5 for any material
misstatements it makes in connection with the offering. Because the
exemption is only available to issuers,85 the offering cannot be made
pursuant to a firm-commitment underwriting, whereby an investment
bank buys the securities from the issuer and resells them in the offering
to the public. The absence of a restriction on general solicitation
means, however, that a broker can be used to solicit purchasers. The
broker would also be subject only to scienter-based Rule 10b-5 liability
and only for any material misstatement that the broker itself makes.
2. Subsequent Trading of Shares. The only way that a Rule 506(c)
offering is more burdened by regulation than a traditional registered
offering is that the offered securities are “restricted.” This means that
purchasers in the offering can only resell their shares pursuant to
Securities Act registration or an exemption therefrom.86 Here too,

83. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
84. See Fatih Guvenen, Do Stockholders Share Risk More Effectively than Nonstockholders?,
89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 275, 281 (2007).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
86. For a discussion of rules and statutory provisions that lead to this result, see Bradley
Berman & Steven Bleiberg, Restricted Securities vs. Control Securities: What Are the Differences?,
INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Dec. 2013, at 1–7.
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however, recent reforms take much of the sting out of this disadvantage
and offer the prospect that the securities will be relatively freely
tradable soon after the offering.
a. Rule 144. One route to relatively free secondary-market trading
is via Rule 144,87 which in recent years has been subject to easing
amendments several times. As a result, restricted shares of an issuer
not providing Exchange Act periodic disclosures become unrestricted
after being held for a period of only one year in the hands of one or
more investors unaffiliated with the issuer.88 As unrestricted shares,
they can be traded freely between any two persons. Liquidity will be
maximized if the issuer chooses to list its stock on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ, but doing so will, under Sections 12
and 13 of the Exchange Act, trigger imposition of the Act’s ongoing
periodic-disclosure requirements that is otherwise avoided by doing a
Rule 506(c) offering rather than the traditional registered offering.
Alternatively, the stock could start trading on an electronic
trading venue that is not registered as an exchange under the Exchange
Act, such as OTCQX or OTCB. Unlike the NYSE or NASDAQ,
trading on this kind of venue would not by itself trigger imposition of
the Exchange Act’s periodic-disclosure requirements. The other
periodic-disclosure-requirement trigger, Exchange Act 12(g),89 is
based on the number of shareholders of record, a number that was
increased in 2012 by the JOBS Act from 500 to 2000.90 A smaller issuer
utilizing a Rule 506(c) offering would be unlikely to trigger the
requirements this way for many years, if ever, after the offering. This
is because the typical shareholder only has a beneficial ownership of
her shares, with record ownership being held by a nominee of her
broker, who is the same record owner for many of the broker’s other
customers who beneficially own the issuer’s stock.91

87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
88. Id. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii).
89. Id. § 240.12g-2.
90. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306,
326 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(a) (2012)).
91. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, Insiders, and the Decoupling of
Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP.
FIN. 343, 358 (2004).
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b. Securities Act Section 4(a)(7). A second route to relatively free
secondary-market trading is via Securities Act Section 4(a)(7),92 a new
registration exemption enacted under the FAST Act in late 2015.93
Under this exemption, as a general matter, a purchaser in a 506(c)
offering would be able to resell her shares without any waiting period,
as can each subsequent holder, as long as, in each case, the subsequent
purchaser is an accredited investor and the seller does not engage in a
general solicitation. This would appear to allow shares acquired in a
506(c) offering to be freely traded immediately after the offering on
electronic trading venues such as SharesPost and the NASDAQ
Private Market, venues that restrict themselves only to orders placed
by accredited investors.
3. Evaluation. Recall that the essential problem with the public
offering of truly new securities is the adverse selection that arises from
a situation of severe information asymmetry: potential investors know
much less about the issuer and the persons associated with it than they
do in an offering by an established issuer, and there is no price for the
same security established in an efficient secondary market to guide
them. Without solutions to this information-asymmetry problem, the
market will unravel. A Rule 506(c) offering relies almost entirely on
the market-based solutions to this problem discussed in Part II, with
little regulatory intervention to ameliorate any of the shortcomings of
these solutions.
a. Signaling. As we have seen, signaling can fail to solve the
adverse-selection problem for a number of reasons: issuer claims of
high quality are not fully credible, issuers have reasons not to disclose
positive information and so silence does not necessarily mean that the
issuer is low quality, silence by a low-quality issuer does not reveal how
much worse it is compared to the issuer that is affirmatively disclosing
facts demonstrating its high quality, and many retail investors are not
attentive to the absence of disclosure on each of a myriad of different
topics nor sophisticated in the inferences that they draw.
The traditional registration process ameliorates all of these
problems and the Rule 506(c) offering process ameliorates none of
them. The traditional procedure increases the expected cost of making

92. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(7) (Supp. III 2015).
93. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 76001, 129
Stat. 1312, 1787–89 (2015) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77d (Supp. III 2015)).
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a misstatement for an issuer by substituting absolute strict liability for
the much harder-to-prove scienter-based liability. Scienter-based
liability, as discussed in Part IV, less effectively deters misstatements
and omissions of mandated information because it makes a claim
harder to bring, consumes more social resources when litigation does
occur, and encourages firms to inefficiently distort their internal
information systems to keep top officials ignorant of material
information that, if disclosed, would lower share price. By mandating
disclosure concerning many matters, the traditional registration
process clarifies the ambiguity that silence has under the 506(c)
procedure with regard to these matters and makes clear the extent of
the differences between the superior and inferior firms. Required
disclosure also makes these many matters more salient to retail
investors and their advisors than would be the case if they had to sort
out which firms made disclosures and which remained silent.
b. Intermediation. The Rule 506(c) offering process, unlike the
traditional registration process, does not allow for a firm-commitment
underwriting. This forecloses an investment bank from lending its
reputation to the offering by purchasing the securities and reselling
them to the public. The 506(c) procedure, because it permits general
solicitation,94 does allow the involvement of brokers, who also can lend
their reputation to the offering. This is likely to be less effective at
combating adverse selection than a firm-commitment underwriting,
however. This is because a broker has much less at stake with respect
to each deal in which it is involved, so there is less value in achieving,
and thereafter protecting, a reputation for only marketing-quality,
truthful issuers. Also, the broker is liable only for its own
misstatements, not the issuer’s, and claimants must prove the broker
had scienter. In contrast, the underwriter is potentially liable for the
issuer’s misstatements under the standard of strict liability subject to a
due-diligence defense, which encourages the bank to investigate the
issuer and insist on disclosure of what it finds.
c. Third-Party Certification.
Third-party certification by
accountants and other experts is as available to an issuer under the
506(c) process as under the traditional registration process. The
traditional registration process creates greater incentives than the
506(c) process for the certifier to be truthful and fully informed,

94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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however, because it backs up the certifier’s potentially somewhat
tenuous concerns about reputation in the statements it makes with
strict liability subject to a due-diligence defense, not just Rule 10b-5
scienter-based liability.
d. Buyer Search. There is little reason to believe that the 506(c)
offering process does a better job than the traditional registration
process at ameliorating the shortcomings of buyer search as a way of
combating adverse selection. It may in fact do a worse job. Although
the 506(c) process confines purchasers to accredited investors, a large
portion of all retail purchasers in a traditional registered offering would
fall into this category anyway. So the 506(c) restriction does little to
increase the percentage of buyers that would be sophisticated enough
to do effective diligence on the quality of an issuer. The lack of
restriction on the number of investors means that the issuer has no
reason, just to fit the requirements of the exemption, to try to raise the
total funds it needs from a smaller number of investors who each invest
more and thereby to create greater economies of scale for investor
diligence. Most importantly, the Rule 506(c) offering process, unlike
the traditional registration process, does not require that all investors
be offered the securities at the same price.95 This means that even if a
retail investor knows that some large sophisticated institutional
investors are purchasing shares in the offering, she cannot rule out the
possibility that the offering appears to them to be a good deal only
because they are being offered a lower price than she is being offered.96
e. Conclusion. Congress, though perhaps not fully aware, was
starting a brave experiment in mandating that the SEC adopt Rule
506(c). The experiment may prove that the traditional regulatory
approach to the public offering of truly new securities has been an
unnecessary burden. The analysis in Parts I–IV suggests, however, that
there is a good chance that it will end poorly.

95. Rule 506(c) offerings permit issuers to offer varying sale prices to different purchasers
for the same securities, depending on factors such as quantity purchased and the desirability of
the prospective purchaser as a shareholder. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).
96. This problem could be cured by a contractual provision between the issuer and
purchasers providing that they are all paying the same price. It is not clear, however, that retail
investors have sufficient sophistication for this to become a standard term. Retail investor
sophistication would need to be great enough that satisfying the resulting market demand for such
a term is more profitable than engaging in price discrimination among investors.
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The most innocuous scenario by which it ends poorly is that the
shortcomings catalogued above are indeed important, but these
shortcomings are recognized by the market from the outset. Under this
scenario, the Rule 506(c) procedure simply generates little interest by
issuers seeking to make public offerings of truly new securities.97
A more harmful scenario by which the experiment ends poorly
would be for these shortcomings to be indeed important, but the
shortcomings are not at first recognized by the market. Under this
scenario, a substantial number of 506(c) offerings funding negative
NPV projects go forward, offerings that would not have succeeded if
the issuer had been required to use the traditional registration process.
Thus the market for 506(c) offerings does not unravel immediately.
Rather, the unraveling does not occur until an economic downturn or
the equivalent of the 2001 bursting of the tech bubble. This turn of
events will reveal the substantial number of offerings that, unknown to
their investors, were low quality from the beginning.
A final way for the experiment to end poorly would be for these
shortcomings to turn out to be less severe than I suggest and for a whole
alternative system to develop for firms to go public and be publicly
traded without being subject to either mandatory offering or periodic
disclosure. Because of this alternative system’s lower private costs to
issuers, it would gradually hollow out the traditional system where
issuers are subject to mandatory offering and periodic disclosure. But,
as discussed in Part IV, the private costs of disclosure are greater than
its social costs and the private benefits less than its social benefits. So
the level of disclosure associated with this increasingly dominant
alternative system would be below what is socially optimal.
C. Regulation A+
The JOBS Act also amended the Securities Act to add to its
provisions relating to exempt securities Sections 3(b)(2) through
3(b)(5).98 Under these amendments, the SEC was directed to establish
what is known as Regulation A+, an alternative system to the
traditional registration process that would be available for a public

97. Figures comparing the amount of funds raised during the first two years of the availability
of this kind of 506(c) by such a method versus by IPOs can be found in SCOTT BAUGUESS,
RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2014, at 2, 11–15 (2015).
98. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401, 126 Stat. 306,
323–25 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2012)).
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offering of truly new securities as long as the offering, combined with
any subsequent offering within twelve months, does not in total exceed
$50 million.99 Regulation A+ in many ways resembles the traditional
registration process but is simpler and less burdensome on issuers. The
SEC adopted final A+ Rules in the spring of 2015.
1. Required Structure of the Offering. Under Regulation A+, the
issuer may engage in a general solicitation to raise money from an
unlimited number of investors. Unlike a 506(c) offering, a firmcommitment underwriting may be used in connection with the offering.
Like with a traditional registered offering, and unlike a 506(c) offering,
there is no need for the investors to be accredited. There is mandatory
affirmative disclosure at the time of the offering, but less is asked than
in a traditional registered offering. There is also a periodic-disclosure
obligation but again it is less burdensome than standard Exchange Act
periodic reporting. The standard of liability imposed on the issuer for
misstatements made in connection with the offering is strict liability
subject to a due-diligence defense. Underwriters and brokers are
subject to liability under the same standard as well.
2. Subsequent Trading of Shares. Shares purchased in a
Regulation A+ offering are unrestricted, which means they can be
traded freely between any two persons as soon as they are purchased
in the offering, the same situation that prevails with a 506(a) offering
because of Rule 144 but a year faster. Thus again the issuer can
maximize liquidity by listing its stock on the NYSE or NASDAQ if it
is willing to have Exchange Act periodic-disclosure obligations
imposed upon it. Alternatively, it can have its shares trade on less
liquid OTCQX or OTCB venues and would only need to provide the
less burdensome level of periodic disclosure required by Regulation
A+.
3. Evaluation. From the foregoing, we can see that a Regulation
A+ offering differs from a traditional registered offering in two
important ways. One is that the issuer, though strictly liable, has a duediligence defense.100 The other is that less is asked of the issuer in the

99. JOBS Act § 401, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2).
100. Regulation A+ provides for Securities Act Section 12(a)(2) liability and allows for a duediligence defense pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77k. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260.

FOX IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/28/2016 3:27 PM

724

[Vol. 66:673

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

form of mandatory disclosure both at the time of the offering and
periodically thereafter.101
a. Lower Liability Standard. The analysis in Part IV suggests that
there is little justification for allowing an issuer a due-diligence defense
just because the issuer is smaller or is raising less than $50 million.
Regardless of these factors, the misstatement or omission of required
information would inflate the price of the security above its value.
Allowing the issuer a due-diligence defense, although not nearly as
serious a problem as requiring the claimant to show scienter, lessens
deterrence by making it harder to succeed against an issuer that has
made a misstatement or omitted mandated information. Moreover, the
suits that are brought consume more social resources than in an
absolute strict-liability regime because more issues are at play. The fact
that the issuer is smaller or is raising less than $50 million is really
irrelevant and in no way reduces the force of these observations.
b. Less Required Disclosure. Whether less disclosure should be
asked of an issuer if it is smaller or is raising less than $50 million is a
more complicated question. One argument for asking less is that the
most persuasive argument in the first place for making an affirmativedisclosure regime mandatory rather than voluntary—that the social
costs of an issuer’s disclosure are less than its private costs and the
social benefits greater than its private benefits—is less compelling in
the case of a smaller firm making a smaller offering.102 The simple idea
here is that the actions of such a firm have less impact on the rest of the
world and so the deviation between its social and private costs and
benefits is smaller. Less should be required of such a firm above what
would be required by the regime that the issuer would voluntarily
choose based on its private calculations of cost and benefit.
Consequently, the mandatory regime should require less of it relative
to what is required of a larger firm making a larger offering. It is
important to note, though, that this argument has no force in terms of
the minimum level of disclosure needed to avoid adverse selection.
The other rationale for requiring less disclosure from a smaller
firm making a smaller offering is that the offering of such a firm poses
offerees with a less complicated financial proposition and so less

101. The lesser ongoing reporting requirements are provided by 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11. See
id. §§ 200, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249, 260.
102. See supra Part III.C.
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information is needed. In essence, this is an argument that the smaller
firm making a smaller offering is typically less complicated and so a set
of questions that is appropriate for an adequate understanding of a
more complicated firm is overkill for a simpler, smaller firm. Whether
the current set of questions in connection with the traditional
registered offering is in fact tilted toward what needs to be known
about a more complicated firm is an open question, however. Most of
the questions concern matters about which an investor would want
information whether the firm was simple or complicated. More
complicated firms just need to give longer answers.
D. Crowdfunding
The JOBS Act also amended the Securities Act to create a new
Section 4(a)(6) exemption from Section 5 registration for
“crowdfunded” offerings.103 The SEC adopted rules for this exemption
effective in the spring of 2016.104 The idea is that capital is raised for a
project through the pooling of numerous very small share purchases.
Investors become aware of the offer from the website of a brokerdealer or a registered funding portal. An issuer can only raise up to $1
million in this fashion in any twelve-month period,105 and so these are
offerings that could not possibly be economically feasible as traditional
registered offerings. Individual purchasers are limited in the amount
they can invest, with investors with incomes or assets of less than
$100,000 generally limited to 5 percent of their income and with betteroff investors generally limited to 10 percent of their income.106 There is
required disclosure at the time of the offering, but it is considerably less
than what is required under a traditional registered offering or even a
Regulation A+ offering.107 A crowdfunding offering does not trigger an
obligation to provide Exchange Act periodic disclosure until the firm
reaches $25 million in assets.108 No general solicitation is allowed
beyond the information available on the website posting the offering.109
The exemption is only for issuers and so the offering cannot be pursued
103. JOBS Act § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2012).
104. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, 274).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)(A).
106. Id. § 77d(6)(B)(i)–(ii).
107. See id. § 77d-1(b) (specifying disclosure requirements for issuers involved in small,
crowdfunded transactions).
108. 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-6 (2015).
109. Id.
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via a firm-commitment underwriting.110 The issuer is strictly liable with
a due-diligence defense.
The preceding evaluations of the different components of the
506(c) offering process and Regulation A+ offering process largely
cover the components of the crowdfunding offering process one way or
the other. Again, there appears to be no justification for providing the
issuer with a due-diligence defense. The low level of affirmative
disclosure, especially when combined with sharp limits on individual
investments, raises serious concerns that adverse selection will cause
the market for these offerings to unravel sooner or later,
notwithstanding the idea that, given “wisdom of crowds,” some
worthwhile investment projects will get funding that would not have
been able to receive funding from traditional non-public-offering
sources.111
One way of looking at crowdfunding offerings is to note that most
states provide legalized space for certain kinds of gambling
notwithstanding the fact that the odds are always against the gamblers.
Given the existence of a demand for opportunities to gamble, why not
channel it into an activity that at least might occasionally fund a
worthwhile project that would not otherwise have received funding,
especially where income- and wealth-related caps protect the gamblers
from damaging themselves too much when the gamble does not work
out? Indeed, it is possible that if investors approach crowdfunding
offers the same way that gamblers approach a casino or a race track,
the market will not unravel despite experience demonstrating over
time that the average offering has a low, or even negative, expected
return.
CONCLUSION
Absent regulation, the determination of which public offerings of
truly new securities go forward and succeed at raising funds, and which
do not, is determined by tort law and the market-determined terms of
contracts into which offering participants enter. This Article has gone
back to first principles to answer whether, and, if so, under what
circumstances, government regulation should be added to the mix. This
110. Id.
111. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 114 (expressing optimism that the “wisdom of crowds” aspect of internet
solicitation will substantially mitigate the adverse-selection problems associated with a lowdisclosure offering to ordinary investors); Ibrahim, supra note 41, at 596–98 (same).
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regulation can relate to what the issuer should disclose at the time of
the offering and thereafter. It can relate as well to the circumstances
under which various offering participants should be held liable for
damages if, at the time of the offering, there were misstatements or
omissions of required disclosures.
These questions are live issues because numerous reforms have
been made in recent years to lessen the burdens of regulation on
smaller issuers making small offerings. The rationale for lessening the
burden on smaller issuers is that the cost of the traditional registration
process has scale economies associated with it that make offerings by
them too expensive to be worth undertaking. This Article expresses
skepticism about many of these reforms. Specifically, it suggests that
these reforms ignore the fact that the core components of the
traditional public-offering registration process play an essential role in
countering the adverse-selection problem that inevitably accompanies
a public offering of truly new securities. The analysis here advises
against structural changes contained in some or all of these reforms,
such as eliminating mandatory disclosure altogether, imposing on
issuers a lower standard than strict absolute liability, and eliminating
the possibility of underwriter intermediation. A more promising
approach would be to review the questions that must be answered
under the traditional registration process. Ones that add more cost to
the process for smaller issuers than they reduce adverse selection
should be eliminated. But such regulatory downsizing can only be
taken so far. A certain minimum range of mandated questions will
need to be kept if we wish to sustain a market for most offerings of
truly new securities, at least outside of the small bets at stake in
crowdfunding. Even if it is possible to scale back the range of questions
in the way described here, the hard reality is that, for firms below a
certain size, the cost of what is still required will make a public offering
and public trading of their shares an impractical form of finance.

